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ABSTRACT
Mrkich, Dale R., M.A., December, 1984 Philosophy 
Egoism, Morality, and Justice 
Director: Richard E. Walton,
This thesis repudiates the position that egoism can serve 
as an accurate description of human nature and that ethical 
egoism can serve as a first principle of society. Ethical 
egoists argue that human beings are naturally and completely 
self-interested. They act rightly, therefore, when they act in 
their own interest. Moreover, acts of benevolence and altruism 
are impossible for human beings, and social cooperation reflects 
only the interests of individual members. Moral objectivists 
reject ethical egoism by arguing that humans are naturally moral 
beings capable of benevolence and altruism toward others. This 
description allows for societies that include the natural 
cooperation of moral individuals.
To prove that ethical egoists are wrong about individuals 
and societies, I examine Plato's Goraias and Republic, and John 
Rawls' A Theory of Justice. In the Goraias. Plato presents the
ethical egoists' position clearly and forcefully in the
arguments of Callicles. Socrates fails, however, to defeat
Callicles' version of ethical egoism in the Goraias. In the 
Republic. Plato again fails to defeat ethical egoism, although 
he succeeds in re-defining self-interest to include acting for 
the good of the ideal city. John Rawls' Theory of Justice
defeats ethical egoism by providing a modern alternative that 
denies self-interest as a basis for a society of moral
individuals.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION:
Among modern writers of popular non-fiction, one group 
consistently tops the best-seller lists. The authors in 
this group write what I call "self-help" literature. These 
authors offer various versions of a common solution to 
life's problems, solutions which take self-interest to be 
the legitimate motivation for human action and interaction. 
They argue that human beings ought to act out of 
self-interest. This simple rule characterizes the moral 
theory known as ethical egoism.
Although my list of "self -help” authors is far from 
complete, I consider several who succinctly state the 
position commonly held by the group. First, I discuss 
Norman Vincent Peale's Power &£ Positive Thinking. This 
book is a good, early example of "self-help" literature that 
is as popular today as it was when it first appeared in 
1952. Peale suggests that individuals rid themselves of 
self-doubt as a sure means to happiness and success. Next, 
I examine Passages, by Gail Sheehy. Although Sheehy's book 
succeeds Dr. Peale's by 26 years, she restates his messages 
in her own terms. If individuals prepare themselves to 
survive life crises, they will survive and even prosper from 
them, regardless of what happens to other individuals 
involved. This survival depends on the rule of ethical 
egoism successfully applied to difficult times in life. I
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have also included references to two "self-help" books 
without elaboration, Eaospeak by Edmond Addeo and Robert 
Burger, and Body Language. by Julius Fast. These works are 
important because they go beyond the common formulae of 
admonishment and advice for success. These books encourage 
individuals to "help themselves," quite literally, to other 
people, who exist as means to their ends. These authors 
contend that intimidation and suggestive, decisive behavior 
enable individuals to manipulate others. Finally, I have 
included discussions of Your Erroneous Zones, by Dr. Wayne 
Dyer, and Looking Out for #1. by Robert Ringer. Taken 
together, these "self-help" books argue forcefully for the 
ethical egoists fundamental moral rule. Both Dyer and 
Ringer justify their positions by claiming that ethical 
egoism offers the best means to the lives that rational 
individuals want.
In general, "self-help" authors all subscribe to the 
idea that egoism accurately describes human nature. These 
books can be understood as guides for discovering and 
implementing egoistic laws of human nature. That is, these 
authors describe a world wherein individuals are encouraged 
to act exclusively for their own benefit. This view of 
human nature is highly suspect, if not completely mistaken. 
The egoism that these authors either mindfully advocate or 
unmindfully imply is based on a theory of moral relativism 
that is destructive of individuals and pernicious to
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society. Ethical egoism ignores and finally disallows many 
common actions that we recognize as distinctly human. 
Moreover, ethical egoism restricts society to minimal 
cooperation without moral significance.
The "self-help" authors represent a tradition in the 
history of philosophy that includes Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan 
and the Sophists of Plato's dialogues. Hobbes, the first 
philosopher to propose a fully developed political theory 
based on ethical egoism, is important to my discussion for 
two reasons. First, he gives the "self-help" authors a 
philosophical legitimacy by showing that these authors have 
not created their ideas by themselves. Rather they are the 
newest advocates of a system of thought with a rich 
historical and philosophical context. Second, an analysis 
of Hobbes' thought shows the social implications of ethical 
egoism. If we believe, with the "self-help" authors, that 
human nature is essentially egoistic, so that society must 
be merely a collection of legitimately self-interested 
individuals, then we can look to Hobbes' analysis for a view 
of what that society would be like.
The Sophists of Plato's dialogues also provide an 
historical and philosophical context for the "self-help" 
authors. Both Socrates and Plato were familiar with the 
Sophists and their persuasive arguments about ethical egoism 
in human nature and society. Indeed my criticism of
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"self-help" literature is analagous to Socrates and Plato's 
criticisms of the Sophists. Consequently, my analysis and 
repudiation of the "self-help" authors as modern Sophists 
reflects and elaborates the Platonic tradition, especially 
Socrates' arguments from the Goraias and the Republic.
Next. I include an analysis of John Rawls' book, A 
Theory of Justice- Rawls' theory of justice includes an 
"original position" wherein persons remain while choosing 
principles to order the basic structure of society. With 
the original position, Rawls imagines a situation where 
individual choosers remain ignorant of information 
inconsistent with a moral point of view, and always choose 
principles of justice-
Rawls' theory eliminates ethical egoism as a first
principle for a society of moral individuals. He denies
that ethical egoism could serve as a first principle in a 
just society because of the natural relationship that exists 
between moral theory and moral experience. Finally, Rawls 
argues that individual moral development, a good for persons 
and society, is consistently realized with his theory of 
justice as fairness.
My conclusion, based on my analysis of the "self-help" 
authors, Hobbes' Leviathan. Plato's Goraias and Republic,
and Rawls' Theory of Justice, includes an explanation of
human nature that opposes ethical egoism. Human beings are
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moral beings, and thus different from all other animals. 
This is, finally, the quintessential human characteristic, 
that allows benevolent and altruistic human actions between 
friends. These relationships give rise to societies that
reflect the moral core of human existence.
*>
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2.0 EGOISM AND MODERN SOCIETY
2.1 Ethical Egoism And Ethical Objectivism
Throughout history people have assumed the existence of 
moral principles and their availability to rational minds. 
Human behavior often reflects this assumption. We praise 
individuals for their moral courage and blame them for 
immoral acts. In extreme cases of wrongdoing we punish 
those responsible. As common as moral praise and blame are, 
there have always been those who denied the assumptions upon 
which these actions rested; since the days of Socrates, 
there have been thinkers who argued that moral values had no 
objective existence, that moral knowledge was not possible.
Philosophers refer to the view that moral standards 
exist and that human beings can know them as ethical 
objectivism.
We call an ethical theory objective if it holds 
that the truth of what is asserted by some ethical 
sentence is independent of the person who uses the 
sentence, the time at which he uses it, and the 
place where he uses it-[1]
These theories assume that human beings' unique nature, the 
capacity for rational thought, enables them to apply moral 
concepts to their discussions of the ends of human action, 
choose effective means to those ends, and to apply moral 
guidelines to help determine acceptable actions and laws to 
govern those actions. Furthermore, theories of ethical
Page 8
objectivism, sometimes called ethical absolutism, assume a 
single, eternally true, and valid moral code for all 
rational men.[2] The morality that offers guidelines for 
human action is in some sense objective. Human actions are 
right or wrong, everywhere and always, because they are held 
to be a single set of objective moral principles. Objective 
moral principles include real truths that human beings must 
discover, recognize, and accept. These principles give 
meaning to the ianguage of moral terms and they make sense 
of the lives of moral individuals.
Theories of ethical objectivism can account for many 
human actions. Different historical, racial, cultural, and 
religious groups have held different, sometimes opposing, 
views of morally correct action. Even groups that have 
coexisted historically often have radically different views 
of what constitutes moral action. These differences help 
explain the warfare and social chaos that comprise much of 
human history. From the ethical objectivist1s point of 
view, however, disagreements among individuals or groups 
about morally correct action do not imply that one or the 
other of them is right or wrong; indeed both may be wrong. 
Nor would agreement on the moral acceptability of particular 
actions guarantee their correctness. All human actions are 
either right or wrong, regardless of what any individual or 
group believes. Therefore, individuals must be able to 
recognize right actions— only then can they act as moral
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persons. Moreover, if an individual or group abhors an 
action that others condone, all the parties may still be 
wrong about its moral propriety. But they cannot all be 
right. Right actions never issue automatically from 
accidents of human judgment, opinions, or ignorance.
According to theories of ethical objectivism, morally
right action remains constant for all men for all time.
Ethical objectivism requires, then,
that before we come to revealed religion, to the 
Bible, to the wise men of the community, or to any 
other source of moral refinement, we have the 
capacity to think ethically, to learn the general 
requirements of good conduct, and to discover, at 
least in a general way, what our obligations 
are.[3]
The single standard of morally correct action is an 
existing framework of moral guidelines that are extensive, 
widely acceptable, recognizable, internally consistent, and 
grounded in human nature prior to the practical agreements 
of individuals. These guidelines they can choose to accept 
or reject. Additions and refinements in this general 
position have provided an endlessly fascinating variety of 
specific theories for real and imagined human actions.
Because ethical objectivism presupposes human 
interaction and requires that individuals be capable of 
acting with and for one another, it follows that ethical 
objectivism allows such theories as benevolence and
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altruism, and systems of law and government based on natural 
law. These theories recognize that human beings act for 
reasons other than self-interest, for example. Action that 
promotes the benefit of another exclusively, without direct 
regard for self-interest, is called benevolent action. The 
possibility of benevolent action underlies theories of human 
action such as altruism, action devoted predominantly but 
not exclusively to the interests of others. Explanations of 
law and government that include theories of benevolence and 
altruism are called theories of natural law. Objective, 
existing, moral principles provide guidelines for laws and 
political institutions as a logical extension of their
effect on naturally social individuals.
Theories of ethical objectivism can best be illustrated 
by examining the opposing view.[4] Ethical relativism
essentially denies that human beings can invoke absolute 
moral standards to explain human action. Ethical 
relativists and ethical objectivists generally agree that
historical, cultural, racial, and religious differences
among individuals and groups account for disagreements over 
correct moral action. But the two disagree on how to
interpret these facts in the context of moral philosophy.
Ethical relativists conclude from these differences that
absolute moral standards simply do not exist. Moral 
standards, like moral actions, vary according to time,
place, and circumstance. That is, similar actions have
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different moral value for individuals or groups, depending 
upon history, culture, and geography.
Ethical relativism denies that differences over current 
moral action only reflect conflicting analyses of right or 
wrong based on ignorance of moral standards. Rather 
relativists argue that similar actions can be morally 
acceptable in one case and unacceptable in another. 
Appropriate moral action reflects solely what individuals 
think or agree is right.
Ethical relativism thus denies that absolute moral 
standards exist at all. Theories based on ethical 
relativism do not even recognize objective standards for 
each time or place. A common example of ethical relativism, 
cultural relativism, is offered by modern anthropologists as 
scientific truth.[5] Individual, subjective standards, 
relative to history, culture, and geography, comprise 
equally the myriad of determinants of moral action.
A popular variant of ethical relativism is ethical 
egoism. Ethical egoism means that individuals determine 
moral standards. That is, sets of moral standards 
applicable to human action are as numerous as acting 
individuals. Generally, ethical egoists act in their own 
interest. There are both weak and strong versions of 
ethical egoism. Those who advance arguments for the weak 
version describe human action as self-interested. They
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contend that, as a matter of fact, human beings act for 
self-interest. The weak version still allows, however, for 
the possibility of benevolent actions, regardless of how 
infrequently they might occur. The weak version describes 
how human beings act. but it does not claim that that is how 
they should act- Although the weak version implies a 
stronger position than it takes, it does not preclude the 
possibility of other kinds of actions from individuals. The 
weak version leaves some room for absolute moral standards 
that could inform benevolent action, for example.
The strong version of ethical egoism, on the other 
hand, disallows even the possibility of benevolent actions 
for human beings. Proponents of the strong version claim 
that rational individuals always act in their own interest. 
Furthermore, individuals ought to act self-interestedly, 
because that is the rational way to act. Proponents of the 
strong version of ethical egoism understand human nature and 
social interaction as void any other considerations. For 
them any theory that includes objective moral standards 
remains fantastic and irrelevant to rational minds. The 
normal political and social organizations of individuals 
under ethical egoism is based upon the social contract. The 
social contract allows cooperation among egoistic 
individuals. It maintains their individual priority by 
letting them participate in society without sacrificing 
their self-interest. Generally, the social contract
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establishes the collectivity as an agreement between the 
individuals who make it up. The social contract requires 
only that individuals do not violate the claims to 
self-interest that other participants assert. The contract 
limits any individual's activities if they interfere with 
the self-interest of other members. The limits on 
self-interested action are established by the laws and 
social institutions of the society designed to maximize the 
satisfaction of individual self-interest.
A conspicuous feature of our own society is the 
egoistic behavior of its members. Individuals constantly 
claim the priority of self-interest, and they do it with a 
vengeance. No price seems too great to pay for the right to 
"do their own thing." This talk of "rights" typefies the 
modern view. Of course, many "rights" claims are trivially 
valid, but they almost always fail to address the 
substantive moral issues involved or to explore the 
implications of their acceptance. It is simply easier to 
claim rights than to answer what constitutes morally right 
action.
The egoistic view of human nature is seriously 
mistaken. Acts of benevolence are not only possible for 
rational individuals, but actually flourish in a society 
that misunderstands, frequently misinterprets, and sometimes 
impugns them. In this paper I examine ethical egoism as a
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variant of ethical relativism and analyze its philosophical 
foundations, including defenders and detractors in the 
history of philosophy. I do so to reject the position and 
to argue instead for benevolent action and the absolute 
moral standards that inform it.
Section 2.2 examines a group of popular modern authors 
who share an egoistic view of human nature. Some of these 
authors offer the weak version of egoism. Since men usually 
act self-interestedly, individuals should recognize that 
they can act to serve their interests specifically. The 
authors explain how self-interest can inform and direct
choices and conduct to help individuals get what they want. 
Other, more confident authors support a strong version of 
egoism. These writers contend that all rational men always 
naturally act to realize their own interests, and that any 
human conventions that interfere with those activities are 
to be ignored. Those who offer the strong version of egoism 
contend finally that moral norms or concepts have no
application to the development or functioning of human 
nature or social interaction.
Although arguments for ethical egoism are common to 
every age. the first philosopher to propose a political
theory based on egoism was Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes argued in 
the Leviathan that the essentially egoistic nature of man 
dictated specific consequences for human society. For
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Hobbes individuals cooperate socially through social
contracts, whereby they agree to compromise self-interested 
action if others do the same. With these contracts they
avoid the social chaos they would otherwise face.
Participation in society under these conditions is a prudent 
choice for individuals, but it is also unnatural to them.
In Chapter 3, I examine Plato's attempts to silence the 
detractors of ethical objectivism at work in his time. 
Although Plato does not name ethical objectivism 
specifically, he alludes throughout his dialogues to a 
universe of absolute moral laws, included in his Theory of 
Forms. These laws substantiate his arguments for the idea 
of the polis as a natural possibility for society 
constituted by moral and social individuals. The idea of 
the polis is not an accidental by-product of the philosophy 
of Hellenic Greece. Nor did Plato misunderstand the moral 
implications of the polis. But Athens, the greatest polis 
of all, had suffered a radical decline in Plato's lifetime, 
so his refutation of the Sophists had to include an 
alternative to the historical events that seemed to 
reinforce their view. In the Gorgias and the Republic Plato 
uses Socrates to argue for an ideal political society and to 
repudiate the egoism of its detractors, the Sophists.
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In the Republic Socrates imagines an ideal polis and 
examines it. The shortcomings of the good city that Plato 
exposes through Socrates' dialogue with the other 
interlocutors finally undermines the possibility of 
realizing an ideal society, but this does not diminish Plato 
or Socrates' enthusiasm for the larger enterprise of 
connecting the ideal Forms to the world of human beings, or 
for the rightness of their general position on moral 
responsibility and social interaction.
Chapter 4 examines John Rawls' theory of justice. 
Rawls' theory is a modern alternative to Hobbes' egoistic 
political theory. Rawls imagines an elaborate arrangement 
of social cooperation based on morality. Rawls' system 
includes a hypothetical "original position" with a "veil of 
ignorance" behind which individuals would remain while 
choosing principles to order the basic structure of society. 
Rawls contends that principles chosen under these conditions 
would be principles of justice, specifically his two 
principles of "justice as fairness." Rawls' analysis 
excludes considerations of egoism as a possible basis for 
social cooperation. Rawls excludes egoism on grounds of its 
being a non-moral position that cannot adequately inform 
social organization for moral individuals.
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In Chapter 5, I reply to the modern egoists, offer a 
repudiation of Hobbes' theory, and argue for the superiority 
of ethical objectivism over ethical relativism. Although 
ethical egoism currently enjoys wide acceptance, it remains 
as inappropriate a view of human nature and society for us 
as it was for Socrates and Plato. The authors of the 
self-help literature either advocate patently immoral acts 
in the name of self-interest or dismiss moral terminology as 
meaningless, thereby revealing their nihilism and cynicism. 
Hobbes' analysis cannot account for many common human 
actions, including actions among family members. Ethical 
objectivist theories, especially John Rawls theory of 
justice, provide an explanation of human nature and society 
that accounts for the diversity and complexity of moral 
experience.
2.2 Self-help And Self-interest:
As Americans we feel confident that we know ourselves, 
who we are and where we are going. We share common values 
that we believe are right. This knowledge informs our 
choices and determines our actions, validates our 
achievements and shapes our goals. Americans regard freedom 
of choice almost reverently. As informed citizens, for 
example, we choose political leaders to shape our society 
from among various economic, political, and social 
alternatives. This we call self-determination, the
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implementation of rights guaranteed by our Constitution. As 
individuals we plan and shape our lives to realize what we 
already know we want. Children can't begin too soon to 
consider what they will become "when they grow up." 
Furthermore as consumers of the goods and services of 
society we trust our inclinations— we know what we" like. 
Life plans and material wealth, what we do and what we have; 
these and other elements characterize success, society's 
imprecise but important measure of individual worth.
Our sense of ourselves as knowing individuals underlies 
our economic ideology. Americans constantly extol the 
virtues of free market capitalism in which, ideally, buyers 
and sellers meet to exchange goods and services at a rate 
determined by supply and demand. These market transactions 
are allegedly clean, competitive, and fair, and prices are 
self-regulating. The market supplies the essential needs of 
our existence and includes the potential for much more. The 
essential needs stabilize the market because they form a 
constant demand for certain goods and services. "Supply and 
demand" also regulates market size and diversity. Among the 
countless accessories of our lives, all available in the 
ideal market place, selective preference shapes the market 
as it reflects individual personalities. Many contend that 
without a visible class structure in American society, you 
are what you own. The market provides the freedom to choose 
what that will be.
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The success of our nation and the accomplishments that 
naturally result from the self-knowledge and free choice of 
individuals defines our image as a nation of doers. As 
citizens of the most powerful economic nation on earth and
the undisputed center of world capitalism, we also know 
collectively what we want and, in most cases, what we need 
to get it. This sense of ourselves automatically invites 
comparison with other nations abroad and among individuals 
at home. Despite the international influences of American 
capitalism, however, it is individuals who make things 
happen, individuals motivated by self-interest and the 
prospect of economic success. Individuals take the risks,
they win or lose, and they reap the rewards they have
earned. Rewards make sense of individual efforts, because
without the anticipation of reward even informed choices 
become pointless striving. In that case they can only 
choose randomly, and they become irrational as well as 
uninteresting. Individual effort in anticipation of reward 
is their best expression of themselves.
Advertising helps individuals choose their rewards, 
offering "distinctive" products that presuppose 
self-knowledge. "You deserve a break today." "For all you 
do, this beer's for you." "Isn't it time you owned a 
"Cadillac?" "Preference" hair coloring— because you're worth 
it." For these slogans to have their appropriate appeal we 
must accept their unspoken premises. These are, first, that
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individual effort is rational and deliberate, based on what 
we know we want- Second, it is reasonable to reward 
individual effort and to expect recognition as an achiever. 
Finally, our achievements rightly qualify us for these 
rewards. We should treat ourselves well because in most 
cases we have earned it. and these products are excellent 
means to that end.
Given our society's profound preoccupation with 
individual achievement and reward, it is not surprising to 
find various types of instruction and advice on success. 
From the emulation of society's winners to the sage 
retrospection of the also-rans, books and articles supply 
society's demand for knowledge of how to go about getting 
what it already know it wants. These primers for success 
include descriptions of necessary attitudes and tested 
methods of winning.
Practical suggestions on choosing correctly among 
lifestyle alternatives and competing successfully in society 
is the subject of much popular literature. Both formal and 
informal "assertiveness training" abounds. Popular songs 
urge us to "make our own kind of music, sing our own special 
song."[6] Magazines and newspapers regularly devote space 
for psychological advice and counseling. Many books also 
deal with popular psychology, enhancing self-image and 
developing the confidence that makes individuals competitive
Page 21
and successful. In general they extol what Norman Vincent 
Peale has called "the power of positive thinking that begins 
with faith in onesself."[7]
Published in 1952, The Power of Positive Thinking is an
influential example of today's popular psychology. Peale
argues that individuals have the power to shape their lives
if they will take the initiative to do so. His opening
sentences state his thesis:
This book is written to suggest techniques and to 
give examples which demonstrate that you do not need 
to be defeated by anything, that you can have peace 
of mind, improved health, and a never ceasing flow of 
energy. In short that your life can be full of joy 
and satisfaction.[8]
Peale claims that many people are "hampered and made 
miserable by the malady popularly called the inferiority 
complex."[9] To dispel feelings of anxiety, despair, or 
self-doubt, he suggests honest self-analysis with a view 
toward reconditioning faulty attitudes about life. If you 
discover the source of the negative aspects of your 
personality, you can replace them with positive statements 
of religious faith. These restore self-image and feelings 
of individual power and self-worth. Usable statements of 
religious faith abound in the Bible. "I can do all things 
through Christ which strengtheneth me" (Phillipians 4:13), 
and "If God be for us, who can be against us?" (Romans 
8:31), are good examples. "Remind yourself", he suggests, 
"that God is with you and nothing can defeat you. Believe
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that you now receive power from Him." If God is all 
powerful, and you receive your power from God, then you too 
are all powerful. This Peale calls "applied Christianity; 
a simple yet scientific system of practical techniques of 
successful living that works."[10]
A recent bestseller, Passages, by Gail Sheehy, also
discusses individual maturity and growth in adult life.
According to Sheehy, everyone goes through established
stages in life, much like the predictable schedule in
William Shakespeare's "Seven Stages of Man."[11] These
stages she calls "marker events."
Everything that happens to us— graduations,
marriages, childbirth, and divorce, affect us.
These marker events are the concrete happenings of 
our lives. A developmental stage, however, is not 
defined in terms of marker events; it is defined 
by changes that begin within. The underlying
impulse toward change will be there regardless of 
whether or not it is manifested in or accentuated 
by a marker event.[12]
For Sheehy change, or passage, is inevitable in human
beings, a constant of the journey from birth to death. By
itself change is neither good nor bad, so questions about
why changes occur are uninteresting to her. Change does,
however, present individuals with opportunities for growth.
The best of all parents have not shielded us from 
wrestling with the problems of security, 
acceptance, control, jealousy, rivalry. The 
strategies we develop, some causing us to be 
tender and loving and others egging us on to be 
competitive and cruel, form parts integral to our 
distinctive character by the end of childhood. To
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"know thyself" in the full sense, one must
eventually allow acquaintance with all these 
parts. This is the one opportunity presented to 
us as we move through a series of critical
passages. [13]
The solutions to the problems of life involve a 
willingness to change. Smart individuals recognize that 
life choices are theirs to make, and if they choose 
correctly, the rewards are theirs to enjoy.
Dr. William Dyer's books also explain how to enjoy the
rewards of modern life. From Your Erroneous Zones through
Pulling Your Own Strings to The Sky1s the Limit, his titles
are uplifting, his prose style direct, and his mood
imperative. Dyer's books reflect his confidence in himself,
and his message for success is simple and often repeated:
As an individual you know what you want from life; 
now you must develop the proper attitudes and 
discipline to realize it in the face of the 
conflicts and disappointments that accompany being 
human.[14]
Consider Your Erroneous Zones. Dyer emphasizes the 
power of individuals to create and sustain happiness for 
themselves, and his books tell how. First you must make the 
right choices about your emotions. That is, you must decide 
in advance to be happy and healthy and independent.[15]
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The things that interfere with individual happiness he 
calls "erroneous zones." Erroneous zones are self-defeating 
patterns of behavior, emotions, or attitudes that force you 
to live in a moment other than "now.” You may, for example, 
feel guilty about your past, badly about your present, and 
apprehensive about your future. These feelings restrict 
your choices for happiness. Nor can you be happy if you are 
hateful, angry, sullen, jealous, vindictive, or even shy. 
Overcome these, he admonishes, so that you can shape your 
life correctly.
Dyer's books help individuals discover and recognize 
"erroneous zones" in their personalities, and they offer 
strategies for eliminating them.[16] He concludes Your 
Erroneous Zones by characterizing an ideal individual-the 
person you could be. He likes everything about life. He 
never complains or feels badly about injustice? he accepts 
the world as it is- He loves himself in the present without 
regret for past actions or worry about the future. In 
short, he makes the right choices, and he is happy.[17]
Other books explain how to 'read1 the characters of 
others to determine what to expect from them as potential 
adversaries. Examples of these are Body Language, by Julius 
Fast, and Egosoeak; Why No One Listens jfcs. You, by Edmond 
Addeo and Robert Burger. The common theses of these books 
are that things individuals say and do, the subtle delivery
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of an innocuous phrase or a seemingly insignificant movement 
reveal valuable information about them that a careful 
listener or observer can use to his advantage. Furthermore, 
since these skills are readily learned, the smart individual 
develops and uses them.
The cover of Eaosoeak states its promise: "Read this
book and people will listen." The claim on the back cover of
Body Language also sets a confident tone for the text.
Your body doesn't know how to lie. Unconsciously, 
it telegraphs your thoughts as you fold your arms,
cross your legs, stand, walk, move your eyes and
mouth. The new science of kinesics deals with
these physical signals that we all send out. Read
Body Language so that you can penetrate the 
personal secrets, both of intimates and total 
strangers.[18]
These books tell how to determine the predispositions 
of others by examining what they say and how they say it, as 
well as how they hold and carry themselves. The term body 
language, for example, refers to "any nonreflexive or
reflexive movement of a part, or all of the body, used by a
person to communicate an emotional message to the outside 
world."[19] Individuals' external characteristics send out 
signals about their inner selves. Others decode these 
signals to determine if an individual might, for example, be 
lonely and receptive to sexual advances, or secure and 
satisfied, and unreceptive to a stranger. Moreover, this
awareness allows one to send, as well as receive, signals.
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Deliberate eye contact, aggressive posture, and 'crowding' 
others in personal encounters could signal that you are in 
control, that you are not easily discouraged or defeated, or 
that you know how to get what you want. In short, "if 
understood and used adroitly, (body language) can serve to 
break through defenses."[20] Business executives, 
politicians, and others would probably find these abilities 
very valuable indeed.
If we acknowledge with these authors that we know what 
we want from life, then we can apply their methods to our 
situations to obtain it, or we can develop our own. Indeed 
these authors encourage individuals to choose and apply 
pieces of their advice wherever appropriate, to experiment 
with different approaches, to decide what works, and to use 
it. They share their view of reality for the price of a 
paperback, no strings attached. They show how our lives can 
be, but claim neither credit nor blame for what we do with 
the knowledge we gain.
For other authors, however, the importance of
individual success does more than describe methods to
realize rational goals. For them the importance of
individual happiness serves as an ethic to inform human 
action by itself. For them, individual happiness answers 
the 'why?' of action as well as the 'how'.
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These authors share a specific view of human nature.
Implicitly or explicitly they all see man as naturally
egocentric, with self-interest the actual motive for all of
his actions. So they prescribe conduct that naturally
proceeds from this view. This view of human nature creates
problems when moral notions that conflict with self-interest
must be considered. The authors argue that justice, for
instance, is an illusory notion that is at worst false and
fantastic, and at best counterproductive of individual
achievement, leading to complicated and sometimes impossible
choices. Consider Dr. Dyer's view of morality in general,
and justice in particular:
If the world were so organized that everything had 
to be fair, no living creature could survive for a 
day. The birds would be forbidden to eat worms, 
and everyone's self-interest would have to be 
served . . .  We are conditioned to look for
justice in life and when it doesn't appear, we
tend to feel anger, anxiety, or frustration.
Actually, it would be equally productive to search 
for the fountain of youth, or some such myth. 
Justice does not exist. It never has, and it 
never will. The world is simply not put together 
that way. Robins eat worms. That's not fair to 
the worms. Spiders eat flies. That's not fair to 
the flies. Cougars kill coyotes. Coyotes kill 
* badgers. Badgers kill mice. Mice kill bugs.
Bugs . . . You have only to look at nature to
realize there is no justice in the world.
Tornados, floods, tidal waves, draughts are all 
unfair. It is a mythological concept, this
justice business. The world and the people in it 
go on being unfair every day. You can choose to 
be happy or unhappy, but it has nothing to do with
the lack of justice you see around you. This is
not a sour view of humanity and the world, but 
rather an accurate report of what the world is
like- . . .Justice is simply a concept that has
almost no applicability, particularly as it 
pertains to your own choices about fulfillment and
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happiness.[21]
Dyer implies that when self-interest succeeds as 
individual happiness, it justifies human action. Reality
denies a place for the myths of morality and other 
conventions of man. At best morality comprises a view 
relative to individuals, depending, for example, on whether
you are the dinner or the diner. At worst moral concepts
demand choices based on considerations other than 
self-interest, considerations that simply do not apply.
Self-interest as the sole motivator and only necessary 
justification for human action is the theme for Looking Out 
for #1. by Robert J. Ringer. Ringer's title prescribes as 
well as describes a way of life and a means for living. 
According to Ringer, "all people act in their own 
self-interest all the time."[22] Everyone's primary
objective in life is to be as happy as possible, he claims, 
and all other objectives are only means to that end. Since 
happiness is a matter of degree, any degree of happiness in 
any individual at any given moment depends on the 
rationality of his goals and his success in attaining them. 
To the degree individuals act rationally and succeed, they 
feel good. "Peelin' good" is the state of mind most 
conducive to individual happiness. Furthermore (and 
fortunately), the more rational one's objectives are, the 
easier they are to obtain.
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Ringer's analysis disallows benevolent action for 
rational human beings. Action that is not self-interested 
is either a mistaken choice caused by irrational selfishness 
or an imprudent choice caused by lack of introspection. Any 
other possiblity is nonsense. If by altruism someone claims 
to mean sacrificing for others, he admits that he is
irrationally selfish--mistakenly doing what he thinks will 
make him feel good by "surrendering a higher value to a
lower one."[23] That is, he mistakenly tries to substitute 
an arbitrary human convention, in this case moral concepts, 
for an immutable law of nature, the priority of
self-interested action. In this case he acts for the wrong
reason. The other explanation for benevolent acts
criticizes the choice itself. Acts of self-sacrifice are 
fundamentally foolhardy, Ringer argues, because with them 
one offers a value with no guarantee that an equal value
will return.[24] Since finite individuals have finite
resources, and self-interest has a natural priority, 
unselfish acts could invite disaster over the long term. 
The interesting question for Ringer is not whether you 
choose to act selfishly or unselfishly, but whether you 
choose to be rationally or irrationally selfish. These 
choices determine whether you mostly enjoy life's pleasures 
or endure its pains.
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Rationally selfish individuals base choices on reason 
and logic. Reason and logic dictate the point of view of
individuals, although it varies among them. But if no one
can decide what's right or wrong for another, how can
individuals choose correct rational actions to achieve 
happiness? Correct long term choices are easily recognized; 
irrational choices result in failure to achieve objectives, 
and rational choices accompany success. Correct short term 
choices are more difficult, but Ringer offers two helpful 
guidelines. He suggests we preface every action with two 
questions:
1. Will the act include a potential for 
bettering our existence by bringing pleasure or
eliminating pain?
2. Will the act forcibly interfere with the 
rights of others to their happiness?[25]
"I cannot explain this phenomenon any more than I can 
explain where space ends or time began, but I have perceived 
its workings, clearly and without fail, over many 
years."[26]
Rational selfishness constitutes the method of Looking 
Out for #1. 'Looking Out' means spending most of your time 
doing things that give you pleasure. It also requires that 
you regard your interests chiefly but not solely. Simple 
reasoning indicates that you must sometimes cultivate the 
interests of others to achieve your objectives, always
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relating to them on a value-for-value basis.
Fellow human beings represent potential values to 
you in business or personal relationships, and the 
rational individual understands that to harvest 
those values he must be willing to fill certain 
needs of others. In this way the most rationally 
selfish individual is also the most "giving" 
person, since he best understands the soundness of 
value-for-value relationships.[27]
Moreover the self-interested activity, 'looking out', 
brings happiness to others besides yourself. This Ringer 
recognizes as "one of the beautiful realities of life."[28] 
At its best, rational selfishness benefits you and others. 
At worst it benefits you and interferes with no one else. 
Indeed every act of rational selfishness finally benefits 
everyone because a happy individual is "one more person on 
the face of the earth who does not represent a burden to the 
rest of the population."[29]
Despite Ringer's dismissal of moral concepts as 
man-made conventions, wholly subservient to egoistic laws of 
human nature, he addresses questions about the morality of 
Looking Out for #1. Is rational selfishness right? For 
Ringer the results of rational selfishness in the quest for 
happiness make it right. He answers the foregoing question 
by posing another: "Can you see any reason why you
shouldn't try to make your life more pleasurable and less 
painful, so long as you don't forcibly interfere with the 
rights of others?"[30] The burden of proof now falls to you,
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if you disagree.
Ringer's position of rational selfishness resembles 
Dyer's exhortations to take control of your life, and 
Sheehy's and the others' encouragement to recognize and 
exploit opportunities for personal gain. Besides offering 
programs for individual success these authors attempt to 
inform and justify human action in the name of 
self-interest. This establishes the basis for right and 
wrong, rational or irrational, individual choices, for 
example. In short, each case serves its author as an ethic, 
and each denies that his position is morally problematic. 
At the same time, each position claims its independence of 
absolute standards by which to judge human action. The 
authors themselves insist on this distinction when they 
argue for the relativity of man-made moral conventions and 
the priority of natural laws about human nature. When these 
authors simultaneously claim the rightness of their position 
and the relativity of moral standards, they seem to be 
oblivious to the problems inherent in the choices they 
recommend. They encourage individuals to act immorally 
while implying that these acts are morally acceptable 
because they are self-interested. This view is not only 
mistaken, it is deceptive and dishonest.
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2.3 The Social Implications Of Egoism:
Mindful of Arnold Toynbee's insight that "it would be a 
mistaken homage to originality to do again badly what one 
feels to have been done better already,"[31] despite the 
revelatory character of these authors' narratives, this view 
of human nature is not new. Questions about the motives and 
responsibilities of individuals in society have interested 
philosophers from the time of Plato and Aristotle. However 
the first fully developed, completely egoistic view of human 
nature we have was offered in the 17th century by Thomas 
Hobbes. Hobbes' Leviathan defines the essential nature of 
man as egoistic and then explores the consequences of this 
nature for society.
Hobbes attaches a notion of social cooperation to a 
particular conceptual framework that includes extreme egoism 
as its basis. His psychology insists that human action is 
always prudent and self-protecting, and never benevolent. 
Rational individuals act only for their own good; 
self-interest always drives individual choice. Moreover,
individuals are natural adversaries, even enemies of their
fellow men, whom they distrust and fear. Men survive by 
rightfully controlling scarce resources as their own, 
defending themselves against invaders, and otherwise 
maintaining themselves and their property.
It may seem strange to some man that has not well
weighed these things that nature should thus
Page 34
dissociate and render men apt to invade and 
destroy one another; and he may therefore, not 
trusting to this inference made from the passions, 
desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by 
experience. Let him therefore consider with 
himself— when taking a journey he arms himself and 
seeks to go well accompanied, when going to sleep 
he locks his doors, when even in his house he 
locks his chests, and this when he knows there be 
laws and public officers, armed, to revenge all 
injuries shall be done him—  what opinion has he 
of his fellow citizens when he locks his doors, 
and of his children and servants when he locks his 
chests? Does he not there as much accuse mankind 
by his actions as I do by my words?[32]
In the natural state of mankind, "every man has a right to
everything, even to another's body."[33] Competition for
survival resources quickly becomes conflict, the war of
every man against every other.
And from this diffidence of one another there is 
no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable 
as to anticipate— that is, by force or wiles to 
master the persons of all men he can, so long till 
he sees no other power great enough to endanger 
him; and this is no more than his own 
conservation requires, and is generally 
allowed.[34]
And therefore if any two men desire the same 
thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, 
they become enemies; and in the way to their end, 
which is principally their own conservation, . 
endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.[35]
The war of every man against every other is 'generally 
allowed' as an empirical circumstance because it is 'no more 
than his conservation requires'. Moreover, in general there 
is no individual powerful enough to stop it. For Hobbes, 
individuals hope to endure by having the wisdom to use their
abilities to acquire the resources they need to survive.
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Contracts between persons cannot replace these fundamentals 
of human nature.
Besides accepting egoism as an accurate description of 
human nature* Hobbes views egoism as a first principle for 
society. Hobbes' idea of social cooperation is limited to 
the protection of members by a tension that says roughly, 
"survive and let survive, as much as resources permit." 
Civil society protects its constituents from invasions from 
without and violations from within as long as it maintains 
the power to do so; that is, as long as its members can be 
required to accept the restraints on aggression that make 
sense of its existence. Hobbes claims that all men possess 
an equality of ability to attain their ends. This might 
imply a social harmony among men because the threat of 
aggression from a strong individual could be deterred by 
cleverness in another, or by a defensive confederacy that a 
bellicose outsider would have to respect. For Hobbes, 
however, an equality of ability means only that men are 
equally vulnerable to attack. Even though enforced social 
agreements encourage individual restraint, social 
cooperation actually exacerbates individual vulnerability 
while it implies a false sense of security. Next, he claims 
that humans are equally convinced of the superiority of 
their own wisdom. "There is not ordinarily a greater sign 
of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is 
contented with his share."[36] Although this might also be a
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point for agreement among men, Hobbes sees it as a basis for 
inevitable conflict. Individual survival requires that 
individuals remain narrow in their world-view, rather than 
achieving a broad overview. Societies can do no better, and 
rarely, if ever, do as well. Finally Hobbes says that men 
have an equality of hope of attaining their ends, their 
"similitude of passions."[37] Individuals believe that their 
desires are both necessary to their lives and reasonable for 
them to achieve. Again, rather than a point of cooperation 
or for species promulgation, this characteristic leads only 
to ruthless competition for individual survival. Social 
cooperation becomes merely an elaborate arena for the 
competition of self-interested activity.[38] If Hobbes is 
correct that man always acts for his own good only, and that 
that good involves using scarce resources as the means to 
his survival, then rational individuals could take no 
comfort in the company of others. Even the closest personal 
relationships would include potential competitors for the 
resources. Harmony in society cannot exist because the best 
social arrangements would comprise only convenience viewed 
with suspicion. Life under these circumstances would indeed 
be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."[39]
For Hobbes, civil society arises when individuals 
respond to the chaotic state of nature. Without a social 
contract, human beings know only competition for the 
resources they need to survive. With a social contract,
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members agree to limit their aggressive actions toward each 
other as long as the society protects them. Participants 
naturally keep their contracts as long as it remains in 
their interest to do so; that is, as long as they get from 
the arrangement what they agreed to when they entered. The 
authority for civil society comes from the participants. 
When they accept a social contract, they allow a government 
to legislate on their behalf.
Legislation to protect participants against aggression 
also restrains their fundamental human nature. Individuals 
participate in society for the "foresight of their 
preservation," and "a more contented life."[40] But this 
requires that they relinquish rights that distinguish them 
as human beings, namely their self-interested nature. Thus 
Hobbes' society is an unnatural arrangement. Moreover, the 
government must maintain the power to guarantee that the 
social contract will remain in force. The state must be 
able to punish individuals who ignore the contract, whoever
they are. This power is at the same time difficult to
*
justify and indispensible to the success of the social 
contract.
Finally, Hobbes' society cannot replace the suspicion 
and fear of others that characterizes the state of nature. 
When individuals agree to forfeit their natural rights of 
self-interest, they only do so to the extent required for
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them to be accepted. Men by nature keep their contracts, 
but when they are so minimally involved, the society can 
never be more than a collection of self-interested 
individuals. Furthermore, everyone knows that everyone else 
is only committed to the society as much as they are. 
Therefore, meaningful social cooperation that could lead to 
the happiness of individuals is never realized.
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3.0 PLATO'S ATTACK ON EGOISM
3.1 The Idea Of The Polis:
Some philosophers have argued that arrangements of 
social cooperation among persons arise as natural human 
responses to the problems of self-preservation. These 
problems are based on the availability of resources and 
skills required for self-preservation, physical environment, 
historical conditions, and other circumstances.[41] 
Moreover, these philosophers maintain that humans are by 
nature political, moral beings, and in this they differ from 
other animals.[42] Besides acts of prudent or reckless 
behavior, individuals may act rightly or wrongly. These 
philosophers further suppose that benevolent action occurs.
In contrast, Hobbes' analysis characterizes human 
individuals as naturally autonomous, and human action as 
radically self-interested. Hence, Hobbes' commonwealth 
never transcends a fragile, unnatural alliance of 
individuals. Natural distrust and* fear requires that 
individuals defer to the commonwealth's power for 
protection. But this deference also requires that they 
forfeit some claims to the resources necessary for their 
survival. This individuals do because they abhor the 
alternative, the inevitable war they would face if the 
commonwealth did not exist and they had to seize and defend 
resources by themselves. They participate in the
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commonwealth to minimize threats to their preservation with 
the hope that social cooperation would eventually allow 
civilized interaction between individuals to flourish.
Plato and Aristotle were philosophers of the former
sort. They viewed relationships between individuals and
society as natural and essential to the development of each.
The polis. the unified city-state, embodied the social and
political structure that reflected the Greek ideal of
individuals in social cooperation. The polis made
citizenship possible and reasonable. It fixed the
allegiance of individual Greeks to a specific society at a
particular place. The polis comprised the life and being of
citizens beyond considerations of individuality and
survival. As Victor Ehrenberg observes in The Greek State:
The use of the same word for individual 
participation in the state (politeia) and for its 
general structure (polis) shows that the 
participation was not in the main a purely legal 
act between individuals and states; it reflected 
the vital adherence of the individual to the 
citizen body, as also to communities inside the
state, and therewith was bound to them, bound to 
religion and soil.[43]
The polis was a society based on kinship that could 
encompass human existence. Religion, art, goods and
services, political and moral discussion— all these needs 
and more could be satisfied in the polis. The Greeks 
admired individuals who could fend for themselves, but they 
also recognized the necessity of the polis.[44]
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The Greeks envisioned a polis implemented through the
rule of law (nomos). The laws allowed the polis to maintain
the power of life and death, acceptance or rejection, over
its members. As Ehrenberg observes:
Venerable in age, yet new every day, the nomos 
could be experienced by every citizen as a 
tangible reality; it preserved the sacred 
traditions of his ancestors and kept the past 
alive; as the will of the gods it ensured the 
future; it expressed, in fact, a sense of
eternity that united the citizen with his
ancestors and descendants.[45]
The view that the Greek polis represented encourages an 
examination of morality in society. Athens, the most 
important polis of all, had declined radically after the 
Peloponnesian War. Athenian society and government in
Plato's lifetime were far from ideal. Were the Sophists
correct when they argued for the priority of self-interest 
and attacked the idea of the polis? The dialogues of Plato 
answer these and other important questions about morality 
and society. In the Goraias. Callicles argues for an
explanation of human nature that demonstrates the lure of 
egoism as absolute political power. Callicles denies the 
possibility of a polis because he sees every society as 
secondary to the appetites of the tyrants who rule them. 
Society remains only a convenient arena for manipulation and 
self-aggrandizement. In the Republic. Socrates imagines an 
ideally just oolis. characterizing life therein, and
exploring its implications for citizens. I turn now to
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these dialogues because they inform my criticism of the 
ethical egoism of their day and ours.
3.2 The Goraias:
The Goraias begins with Socrates seizing an opportunity 
to ask the famous teacher and rhetorician, Gorgias, a simple 
question: What exactly does he profess and teach
(447c)?[46] Gorgias, who claims as a "feature of his
display" (447c), to have an answer for any question, replies
that he is an expert rhetorician and teacher of rhetoric 
(449a). This exchange sets the tone for the dialogue that 
follows. Socrates begins with questions as usual; Gorgias 
answers unhesitatingly and without reflection. Gorgias 
knows about the art of persuasion With words, and he also 
knows how to make artists of others. This knowledge has 
made him rich, famous, and successful, and his reputation 
makes his visit an occasion. Immediately, however, Socrates 
poses questions that demand more than the usual display from 
Gorgias.[47] Socrates insists that Gorgias reply 
specifically and succinctly, in short, in an unusual 
(although not unfamiliar) way. But Gorgias remains 
Unruffled. "You will admit", he promises, "you have never 
heard a speaker more concise"(449c).[48] Gorgias intends to 
show Socrates that restricting his oration to concise 
answers will not guarantee the specific information that
Socrates seeks. Socrates persists in the face of the
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implication that Gorgias controls all the information of 
their dialogue, including that which Socrates will finally 
extract.
The dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias proceeds
until Socrates catches Gorgias in an inconsistency. At
454b, Gorgias claims that rhetoric, "the power to convince
by your words"(452e), creates "persuasion employed in the
law courts and other gatherings . . . and concerned with
right and wrong"(454b). That is, the master of rhetoric
knows right from wrong, and this knowledge helps him
persuade others to do right. But as Socrates points out,
rhetoric can also create conviction that is "persuasive but
not instructive about right and wrong"(455). Rhetoric can
also issue in belief without knowledge. Furthermore, at
456e-457a, Gorgias observes that students of rhetoric, or
any art, sometimes go wrong, and he disavows blaming
teachers when this happens. An evil individual might use
rhetoric to enhance himself politically, or to amass a
personal fortune; he might compromise other citizens or the
city-state for his own ends. Like other arts, rhetoric
requires professional responsibility in its application,
according to Gorgias.
One should make proper use of rhetoric as of
athletic gifts, and if a man becomes a rhetorician 
and makes a wrongful use of this faculty and
craft, you must not, in my opinion, detest and
banish his teacher from the city. For he imparted 
it for a good use, but the pupil abuses it (457b).
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Later Gorgias regains his self-confidence. At 460, he 
claims that if his students cannot tell right from wrong, he 
can teach them. Having knowledge of justice assures that 
students of rhetoric will persuade rightly and shun
injustice (460c). But this conclusion ignores facts of
political life and human history. Many individuals with the 
best instruction from the greatest teachers have proven 
themselves evil. Many have embraced injustice in the past; 
some have become tyrants. These claims are also at odds 
with Gorgias' earlier contention that teachers should not be 
held responsible for the wrongs of their students. If 
teachers possess knowledge of right and wrong and withhold 
that knowledge from students, they are directly responsible 
when a student, in ignorance, acts unjustly. This is
especially true if the teacher has prepared the student for
a political career. On the other hand if Gorgias cannot 
teach his students right from wrong, then he is an idle 
braggart and a liar because he cannot answer any question. 
At this point Gorgias retires from the discussion.
At 461b Polus enters the discussion in earnest. After 
some initial sparring between an indignant Polus, who 
believes his master has suffered unnecessary insult from 
Socrates, and an impatient Socrates, whose questions of 
Gorgias remain unanswered, the dialogue begins anew. Polus 
claims that he knows what Gorgias knows, and like Gorgias 
can answer any question. Socrates challenges Polus directly
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and immediately: "Then do whichever of the two you choose
now, question or answer"(462b). In reply to Polus' first 
question, Socrates states that rhetoric is not art but 
"routine," a way of doing something. That is, rhetoric is 
like cooking or any form of individual "flattery" that helps 
guarantee desired responses. This evaluation elaborates 
Socrates' repudiation of Gorgias. Rhetoricians massage the 
powerful with words, and enjoy the rewards that favor earns. 
These exchanges relate to truth and knowledge, however, only 
as much as honorable persuaders or coincidence provide. 
Although Polus claims that rhetoric is "the noblest of arts" 
(448e), Socrates has shown that the practice of rhetoric can 
not guarantee the truth of its content or the character Of 
its agents. In fact, Socrates claims, rhetoricians often 
pursue their own interests without regard for either truth 
or knowledge. Their successes in these endeavors depend on 
special "knacks" they have learned from experience.[49]
Socrates characterizes the routine of rhetoric, like 
cooking, as dependent upon tricks that gratify the tastes of 
patrons. Polus agrees. "(But) you do not think rhetoric a 
fine thing, if it can produce gratification among 
men?"(462c). Socrates answers that because these activities 
share a common source in flattery, they remain deceptive and 
finally dishonest means to self-interested ends. Rhetoric 
bears no relation to anything true or real. Rather it 
allows deception and contrived knowledge as means to
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persuade. Still, Polus observes that orators do in fact 
exercise powers of life and death, wealth or poverty, and 
acceptance or banishment over the citizens of a city-state 
(466c-d). Furthermore we should envy orators because their 
power enables them to do whatever they want, to act in their 
own interest. Socrates replies that if rhetoric's primary 
goal is self-interest, then rhetoricians are hedonists and 
thus neither enviable nor pitiful (466b). Moreover, 
rhetoric cannot serve self-interest unless rhetoricians know 
exactly what that entails. Socrates' repudiation of Gorgias 
shows that rhetoricians cannot claim that knowledge with 
certainty.
Socrates argues that men will what they do for the good 
they seek; they act for the sake of good. For example, an 
individual may slaughter others or banish them or confiscate 
their property if those actions prove good for him or the 
city-state he represents. But if an individual kills or 
banishes another because he mistakes a harm for a good, then 
he acts upon what seems good to him. Individuals whose 
ignorance allows mistakes cannot possess great power. Polus 
replies that any exercise of power makes the perpetrator 
enviable to the powerless, regardless of knowledge.
Polus denies Socrates' distinction between power justly 
and unjustly applied. For Polus any power brings more good 
to the possessor than its absence. Socrates counters with
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his remarkable assertion that individuals who act unjustly 
are pitiful and never enviable because "to do wrong is the 
greatest of evils" (469b), far greater than suffering 
wrongdoing. Polus questions Socrates' sincerity, and the 
dialogue seems deadlocked. Polus yearns for the absolute 
power of the tyrant, while Socrates denies that he would 
accept that role under any circumstances. Polus argues for 
an egoistic view of human nature, a view that Socrates 
cannot accept.
Polus offers a specific example to prove that men often 
act unjustly and remain happy, that is, they avoid 
punishment. He recounts the tale of Archelaus, the ruler of 
Macedonia. This wicked man, son of a slave, murdered his 
master and another rightful heir, and seized the throne for 
himself.
And so now after committing greater crimes than 
any in Macedonia, (and realizing the power of the 
throne), he is the most wretched, not the happiest 
of all Macedonians, and I suppose there are other 
Athenians besides yourself who would prefer to be 
any Macedonian rather than Archelaus (471c).
Polus notices that Archelaus' star has risen spectacularly, 
regardless of the actions he took to ascend. Naturally 
then, he is happier— rulers are always happier than slaves. 
No other conclusion makes sense. Can Socrates seriously 
contend that Archelaus the tyrant was unhappy compared to 
his former condition as Alcetas' slave? Can Socrates 
pretend that anyone besides himself believes this prattle?
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Polus thinks not. Rather he implies that Socrates is
playing devil's advocate.
Socrates replies that rhetoric is, in fact, "worthless 
toward discovering the truth" (472a). He contends, and
Polus agrees, that doing wrong is more shameful than 
suffering it. Furthermore, shameful behavior brings evil to 
the soul. Therefore, doing wrong is worse than suffering 
wrongdoing, because it damages the wrongdoer's soul.
Socrates ends his discussion with Polus by implying 
that rhetoric is of little use except to those who do wrong. 
At 481b Callicles picks up the dialogue with Socrates. 
Callicles has listened to Socrates repudiate Gorgias and 
Polus, but he remains incredulous. "Tell me Chaerephon, is 
Socrates earnest or joking?" (481b). With this question 
Callicles re-establishes the sophists' skepticism about 
universal standards of knowledge and moral value. "If 
Socrates is correct," Callicles remarks sardonically, "then 
rational persons everywhere have chosen to act opposite the 
way they should"(481c). This Callicles finds preposterous. 
The dialogue between Polus and Socrates leaves unanswered 
questions about whether or not overwhelming evidence 
precludes the possibility that rational human beings can act 
other than egoistically. Callicles will speak to this point 
directly.
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Throughout Polus1 discussion with Socrates, he offers 
examples to show his envy of individuals who install 
themselves as tyrants. Callicles accepts and reinforces 
Polus' admiration for tyrants when he argues for the 
naturally human aspect of the tyrant's methods. 
Furthermore, Callicles dismisses questions of right or wrong 
pertaining to the tyrant's actions— tyrants always act 
rationally to maximize self-interest and consolidate power. 
Acting otherwise would be irrational, unnatural, inhuman. 
Unlike Polus and Gorgias, Callicles is fully aware of the 
implications of his position. Callicles readily accepts 
responsibility for his understanding of the world and human 
nature. He is not a practicing Sophist, but he is an 
excellent rhetorician, "a typical product of their 
education."[50] Callicles' zeal and conviction demonstrate 
the appeal, the power, and the danger of rhetoric. He 
employs popular prejudices taught by skeptical Sophists, 
fraudulent means of justification, and false notions about 
human nature to reinforce his contention that rational human 
activity naturally includes striving for absolute political 
power to realize self-interested ends. Callicles' speeches 
epitomize ethical egoism.
At 482c Callicles challenges Socrates' contention that 
to do wrong and avoid punishment constitutes the worst of 
evils. Callicles draws a distinction between nature and 
convention; nature reflecting the world and human nature in
Page 50
fact, and convention reflecting the way the masses would 
prefer them. According to Callicles, Socrates ignores this 
essential distinction as he chooses, and this tactic helps 
him trick Gorgias and Polus into admitting contradictions. 
That is, while Socrates "claims to pursue the truth, (he) 
actually drags (his interlocutors) into these tiresome 
popular fallacies, looking for what is fine and noble, not 
by nature, but by convention"(482e).[51] Furthermore, since 
nature and convention are fundamentally antagonistic, 
ignoring this distinction results in confusion when someone 
tries to speak for one or the other. This confusion 
comprises Socrates' delight. If one does not distinguish 
between the priority of individual good over collective 
good, for example, any argument preferring individual good 
will include collective good, and vice versa. If no 
distinction exists between concepts, then one can never have 
priority. Callicles argues that because nature and 
convention are mutually exclusive concepts, proceeding 
without clearly distinguishing between them is impossible.
To some extent Callicles has accurately criticized
Socrates' position. Socrates does not take time in his
discussions with Gorgias and Polus to define his terms. 
This is not surprising, however, because the Sophists make 
the claims to knowledge that Socrates questions. Still, 
Socrates' questions could be more penetrating if he required 
Gorgias and Polus to define their terms. Plato uses
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Callicles to keep Socrates honest. Callicles brings an 
objectivity to the discussions with Socrates that forces 
Socrates from his usual method of investigation. In short, 
Callicles forces Socrates to state his beliefs; that is, to 
define his terms. Meanwhile, Callicles maintains a view 
opposite Socrates' with great enthusiasm and self-assurance. 
He remains a committed egoist.
Socrates himself seems to regard Callicles highly. In 
reply to Callicles1 accusation that Socrates has wasted his 
individual potential on philosophy, Socrates expresses his 
delight.
If my soul were wrought of gold, Callicles, do you
not think I should be delighted to find one of
those stones wherewith they test gold— the best of
them— which I could apply to it, and if it
established that my soul had been well nurtured, I 
should be assured that I was in good condition and 
in no need of further test?(486c).
In meeting Callicles, Socrates considers that he has found 
such a "godsend"(486e).
Callicles dismisses human conventions as the opinions 
of the weak majority. The majority intends to restrain 
natural leaders, the strongest among them, from emerging to 
claim their advantage. But according to Callicles, "nature 
herself makes it plain that it is right for the better to 
have the advantage over the worse, the more able over the 
less" (483c). Thus man is like other animals. Furthermore, 
societies of human beings resemble groups of animals. A
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strong individual dominates those weaker than himself, 
subjects them to his will, and enjoys his advantages over 
them. The differences between societies of human beings and 
animals arise with human conventions that discourage strong 
individuals from realizing their potential. These 
conventions cannot alter the natural condition of society.
Socrates asks Callicles to confirm his definition of 
justice, "that the more powerful carries off by force the 
property of the weaker, the better rules over the worse, and 
the nobler takes more than the meaner" (488b). Callicles 
further states that superior physical strength naturally 
commands the respect of weakness, because 'better' is always 
preferable to 'worse.'[52] Socrates points out that if the
many are more powerful than an individual, if they can
restrain his will to dominate them to realize his advantage, 
then the majority also maintains a valid claim to rule.
Strangely, Callicles agrees (488e). Next Socrates states
that if the majority in its conventional wisdom believes 
that it is more shameful to do than to suffer wrong, then 
because they are in fact collectively physically superior to 
individuals, their beliefs and ordinances also enjoy a 
natural validity. So Callicles was wrong when he 
distinguished between nature and convention at 482e, because 
Socrates has shown that they are equivalent. Socrates 
challenges Callicles to show how a strong individual is 
qualitatively superior to the many, and can claim the right
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to rule on that basis. Callicles responds with a thinly 
disguised ad hominem abusive argument that also begs the 
question of whether or not adults should study philosophy. 
Callicles again suggests that Socrates is too old for 
philosophy, which is what he asserted and did not prove at 
484c.
Socrates begins again by asking Callicles to clarify 
his use of "better," if it does not mean stronger.[53] By 
"better," Callicles means nobler, wiser, more sensible
individuals (490). Specifically Callicles refers to
individuals "wise in the affairs of the State" (491b) . 
These men have the courage and wisdom to rule, so they 
naturally deserve that right. Moreover, the best ruler will 
"suffer his appetites to grow to the greatest extent and not 
check them, and through courage and intelligence should be 
competent to minister to them at their greatest to satisfy 
every appetite with what it craves"(492).
This passage relates material wants to the power of 
rule. According to Callicles, all individuals deserve 
whatever rewards they can seize, and the best rulers reward
themselves with whatever they want. Callicles implies that
this is an essential motivation to rule. Consequently, the 
best rulers will live as they rule, by serving their 
appetites as they guard and enhance their power. This 
demonstrates their enthusiasm and fitness for rule. But
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what happens if a ruler becomes obsessed with satisfying his 
appetites to the exclusion of every other aspect of his
rule? Socrates does not ask and Callicles does not reply. 
Probably the next "natural leader" seizes the power that
allows him to act in his interest.
Callicles' position is now clear. The best rulers have 
the most of everything they want because they have the power 
to seize it for themselves. The fact of this situation 
establishes the rightness of it. At 492e Socrates turns to 
examine the implications of Callicles' position. From here 
on, Socrates and Callicles make parallel speeches that
cannot converge to agreement. These speeches contain none
of the agreement that Socrates hoped would lead to truth. 
For Callicles the facts of society are that individuals 
naturally exhibit egoistic tendencies. Socrates counters 
that human happiness can never depend on an egoistic view of 
human nature.
At 495, Callicles agrees that there is no distinction 
between pleasure and good. Good things yield pleasures to' 
their owners, and pleasure is good by definition. But this 
position contradicts Callicles earlier shock at Socrates' 
discussion of pederasty as an example of an evil pleasure. 
Socrates then reiterates Callicles' distinction of courage 
from knowledge, and pleasure from them both. These 
distinctions require that knowledge and courage exist apart
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from the good, which Callicles will not admit. Fools and
cowards can never be good men; wise and brave men always
are. (Otherwise no distinction exists between wise men and 
fools, and brave men and cowards.) Callicles further
contends that knowledge and courage must include goodness,
and Socrates argues that the three must remain separate. At 
499 the interlocutors agree that good and bad individuals 
exhibit respective qualities in equal degrees; that is, 
through an equal presence of good or evil in them. But 
Callicles still insists on degrees of pleasure and pain, 
increased pleasure better and increased pain worse. 
Furthermore, some pleasures will profit individuals and some 
will prove costly. The same holds for pain. Therefore, 
Callicles argues, individuals should pursue the most 
profitable pleasures and pains to enhance self-interest 
because individuals act for that good and not for pleasure 
only. With this Callicles effectively abandons the hedonism 
of his earlier statements.
At 500d Socrates discusses seeking good and seeking 
pleasure.
Since you and I have agreed that there is a good 
and there is a pleasant, and that the pleasant is 
different from the good, and that there is a 
method of studying and contriving to acquire each, 
one method for pursuing pleasure, another for 
pursuing good.
A method of studying to acquire good would help a ruler rule 
for good, to improve the souls of citizens, and not simply
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for his pleasure (503d). This method would eliminate the 
need for rhetoricians to teach political leaders at all.
Socrates' questions at the end of the Gorgias remain 
unanswered, just as Callicles remains unconvinced by the 
challenge from Socrates' mythical tale to "let anyone
despise you as a fool and do you outrage if he wishes, for
you will suffer no harm thereby if. you are really a good man
and an honorable, and pursue virtue"(527c). More 
importantly, Socrates has not defeated egoism in the
Goraias.
3.3 The Republic:
In the Gorgias Socrates reveals the nihilism of the 
Sophists by exposing the inconsistent logic of their 
positions. Socrates also rejects but does not effectively 
repudiate the extreme egoism of Callicles. Socrates raises 
many questions in the dialogue that remain unanswered, and 
he makes assumptions about the relationships between 
individuals and society that he fails to prove. For 
example, he postulates that moderation in individuals 
equates with justice in cities. In the Republic Plato 
continues to expound Socrates' philosophy and to examine the 
relationship between ethical egoism and moral objectivism in 
society.
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The Republic recounts a discussion between Socrates and 
others on the subject of justice. Through the conversations 
of Socrates and his interlocutors Plato tried to create an 
ideal city in speech and determine the nature of moral 
goodness in the individual.[54] Socrates constructs a 
theoretical polis as a social and political structure which 
makes sense of the moral lives of its citizens. He attempts 
to explain how we can understand individuals and cities as 
simultaneously distinct and naturally interrelated, so that 
justice in the cities reflects the nature of their citizens.
Like the Gorgias. the Republic operates on several 
levels. It attempts to elaborate Plato's Theory of Forms. 
Socrates' argues for moral absolutes in which instances of 
morally right acts participate. Socrates de-emphasizes the 
disjunction between the ideal and actual as wrongheaded. 
From the outset Plato challenges the view that theory and 
practice are mutually exclusive or even separate. For Plato 
practice was only worthwhile as it was adequately grounded 
in theory. Throughout the Republic the theoretical and 
actual are essentially conjoined by Socrates to create an 
ideal social structure.
In Book I Socrates attempts to expose and repudiate the 
definitions of justice presented by the rhetorician 
Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus denies the possibility of 
justice as a moral absolute in favor of a definition based
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on experience and convention. His position denies any
legitimate position for theory. Socrates argues for the 
notion that justice must be a transcendant good, but when 
his exercise falls short of convincing his interlocutors, 
they require him to construct a theoretical city in which 
justice is as indispensible to citizens as the structure 
itself is natural to them.
Furthermore the Republic is an exercise in education
for Plato's brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus. The situation
of the discussion is reminiscent of that in the Goroias and 
other Platonic dialogues. Here Socrates seeks a definition 
of justice in discussion with young aristocrats who are
future leaders. Similarly he has dialectically pursued a 
definition of courage with generals in the Laches, and a 
definition of moderation with future tyrants in the
Charmides. But the Republic is also different from the
other dialogues. The former end without finally resolving 
the definition in question. Only the first Book of the
Republic displays this character. The change in tone in the
subsequent Books and the transformation of Socrates from a 
questioner to a teacher about the nature of justice indicate 
the importance of an adequate definition in this case.
The method in the Republic is also purposefully
constructed. The decision to seek justice within the city 
first and to maintain the ethical distinctions between
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cities and men keeps before our eyes the question of whether 
that which makes for healthy cities is essentially the same 
as that which affords a healthy soul for individuals. The 
answers to these questions will help us decide whether an 
individual can realize the advantages of self-interest by 
living in a city. They will form the basis for the 
education of Glaucon and Adeimantus.
The Republic begins with Socrates and Glaucon returning 
from the Piraeus where they had gone (probably) to help 
celebrate a new goddess in the Athenian cult.[55] 
Polemarchus and Adeimantus meet Socrates and Glaucon and 
persuade them to remain in the Piraeus with the promise of 
continued festivities to honor the new goddess. The 
travelers agree, and all repair to the house of Polemarchus1 
father, Cephalus. At Cephalus' house they encounter a group 
of men, including Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, a Sophist 
and teacher of rhetoric. Discussion immediately ensues, and 
after greeting Cephalus, the well-respected old man, 
Socrates asks him this question: "What do you suppose is
the greatest good you have enjoyed from possessing great 
wealth?"(I, 330d). Cephalus replies that his wealth has 
allowed him to avoid deception and always give his due in 
dealings with gods and men (1,331b).[56] This behavior 
reflects Cephalus' view of himself as a just man, one who 
"speaks the truth and pays debts" (I,331b).
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Cephalus defines justice as telling the truth and 
giving what is due to gods and men. This can be determined 
by the laws of the city governing ownership, which are 
sanctioned and protected by the gods. To act justly for 
Cephalus is to act from self-interest, specifically to 
protect one's property. To act justly is to appease 
creditors, human and divine. Cephalus' definition of 
justice is a version of the definition offered later by 
Thrasymachus.
Cephalus' definition is vulnerable on two related 
accounts. First, everyone would agree, according to 
Socrates, that it is just to pay one's debts. But we could 
imagine a situation where in order to serve his own 
interests, one would avoid paying debts. In the case of the 
madman and his weapons (I, 331c), Cephalus' definition could 
require an action that did not serve the interest of either 
party; the result of abiding by the law would probably be a 
great injustice.
Moreover Cephalus' definition only gives an account of 
what appears to be justice, which may or may not be realized 
in the actions of individuals. Imagine, for example, a rich 
man with money to pay his debts who does so only grudgingly. 
Under Cephalus' definition he would be considered a just man 
because of his payment. Conversely a poor man who wanted to 
pay his debts but could not would be considered unjust.
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Cephalus takes no account of the inclinations of an 
individual in his actions toward others. His claims to 
decency are founded on facts which bear only incidentally on 
the moral issues involved.
At this point Polemarchus comes to the aid of his 
father. He begins by arguing that "it is just to give to 
each what is owed"(I, 331e). By this he means that we 
should do good for friends and harm to enemies. This is a 
political definition which still implies extreme 
self-interest. For Polemarchus justice is a means to the
preservation of one's life and property, and his city as
well.
Socrates shows that if the world of human activity can 
be divided into crafts or professions, then justice as 
defined by Polemarchus is useless in doing good or harm. A 
craftsman may do good or harm, but this is nothing beyond 
the exercise of his craft. Polemarchus finally agrees that 
the just man would do good for friends and not harm anyone.
Thrasymachus then can refrain from participation in the 
discussion no longer. His strategy from the outset is to
dismiss Socrates' position in his exchanges with both 
Cephalus and Polemarchus as nonsense. He argues that 
justice will not be defined unless someone takes the 
initiative to define it. This is not likely in dialogue,
with its constant searching, questioning, and refutation.
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"Why do you act like fools making way for one another?", he 
asks (336c). Nothing can be decided about justice if 
someone does not define the term and defend his definition 
against detractors.
Thrasymachus offers rhetoric, the opposite of the 
dialectical method, to establish the superiority of one 
definition of justice over others. Thus he challenges 
Socrates to "answer yourself and say what you assert justice 
to be"(I, 336d). Thrasymachus has invited Socrates to
debate justice as an exercise in rhetoric. Thrasymachus 
hopes to prove himself the superior rhetorician by defending 
his definition of egoism.
Thrasymachus defines justice as the advantage of the 
stronger, specifically, "Justice is the same in all cities, 
the advantage of the established government"(I,339a). The 
ruling class will determine the way of life in the city. 
Laws, therefore, will vary with the dispositions of those 
who rule. Rulers decide what serves their own interests, 
and they legislate to advance those interests. That is, as 
rulers they offer their egoism as a first principle for 
their societies.
For Thrasymachus the notion of justice as an ideal is a 
dead-end street. Justice is nothing other than what is 
advantageous to the stronger. Even if a transcendental 
justice did exist it would have to be affected through the
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laws of a city, and the laws advance the rulers' interests. 
Moreover, the city is merely a collection of factions in 
competition for power. Shifts of power inevitably result in 
new laws and an accompanying re-definition of justice. 
Simply stated, Thrasymachus' position is that the will of 
the lawmakers defines justice, and different sets of laws 
from different rulers will reflect different definitions of 
justice. Obedience to the law is not necessary to the 
advantage of non-citizens or even to the citizens 
themselves, but it always reflects the interests of the 
rulers. Thracymachus also asserts that injustice is more 
profitable than justice. This supports Socrates' contention 
that justice exists as an ideal, and it undermines 
Thrasymachus' position that justice is simply what is 
advantageous to the powerful.
Socrates argues, on the other hand, that justice must 
exist prior to laws to provide a sufficient condition for 
good laws. Socrates does not deny that in ordinary 
circumstances it is the stronger that establish laws with 
their rule. He also agrees with Thrasymachus that the 
nature of rulers is the essential feature of politics. His 
questions, however, are concerned with the nature of justice 
itself and its relationship to politics in general, and to 
rulers and their laws in particular. Are laws established 
by those in power right by that fact? Must all rulers be 
motivated by self-interest in the way that Thrasymachus
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claims they are? Is there a possibility of a ruling class 
or party that is both capable because it is strong and just 
because it is public-spirited? Is justice merely a function 
of the laws of a party in power, or a pre-existing standard 
for morally correct action among human beings?
At 338c Socrates turns to refute Thrasymachus' 
position. He begins by examining the ruler's situation. He 
places Thrasymachus on the defensive, showing that by his 
own admission, rulers sometimes make mistakes about their 
advantage. But justice cannot be understood in terms of 
lawfully serving rulers unless they know their advantage. 
Furthermore if those who are ruled are required to act in 
ways disadvantageous to rulers, the law allows injustice, 
that is, "the weaker are commanded to do what is doubtless 
disadvantageous for the stronger" (I, 339e).
At this point Cleitophon interrupts the conversation to 
come to Thrasymachus' aid. He suggests that perhaps 
Thrasymachus meant that the advantage of the stronger is 
what the stronger believes to be advantageous, whether or 
not this is in fact the case. His position is that justice 
is what the city says is just, and the city may be mistaken. 
The city's apparent advantage could be other than its real 
advantage. Thrasymachus declines Cleitophon's explanation 
as a restatement of his position. Thrasymachus is a teacher 
of rhetoric and shaper of individual political fortunes.
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This position presumes that he has knowledge to transmit; 
that is, some craft to teach in return for his fee. And if 
he teaches anything to potential rulers about how to realize 
their advantage, he must also be able to instill in them the 
confidence to determine what that is. Cleitophon1s 
interpretation implies that the ruler is defined by his
position and not by any skill which allows him to determine
his self-interest. This would undermine Thrasymachus' 
credibility as a teacher.
In declining Cleitophon's argument as a clarification 
of his own, Thrasymachus seems to abandon his common sense 
view of justice. Surely actual rulers often make mistakes 
about their advantage, and by embracing Cleitophon's 
position, Thrasymachus could still argue for his definition 
based on the human frailty that often gives advantage to the 
superior rhetorician. But Thrasymachus sees the matter 
differently. If that which is just is equivalent to that 
which is legal, and if there can be no appeal from the laws 
of a city, then the laws must be infallible. Moreover laws 
must always reflect someone's advantage. The rulers know 
their advantage, and they make laws to reflect that
knowledge.
The debate then focuses on Thrasymachus' egoism. It is 
Thrasymachus' position that ruling is an art which is
conducive to the ruler's good. But Socrates argues, and
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Thrasymachus finally agrees, that arts consist in serving 
others. Socrates concludes, "there isn't ever anyone who 
holds any position of rule, insofar as he is a ruler, who 
considers or commands his own advantage rather than that of 
what is ruled and of which he himself is the craftsman"(I,
342e). So if ruling is an art Socrates has refuted
Thrasymachus1 definition because rulers serve the ruled as 
well as themselves. Socrates argues that men cannot at the 
same time rule in Thrasymachus' precise sense while they 
primarily seek their own advantage.[57]
Thrasymachus' definition of justice is absolute for 
those in power and arbitrary for those not in power. But he 
alludes to Socrates' notion of justice as transcendental 
when he uses the idea to explain the actions of those in
power. He offers the fact that men submit to stronger
rulers to ground his claim that they ought to do so as a 
moral requirement. At the same time, however, he has 
disallowed the existence of justice as an independent moral 
ideal. To apply his definition he must make assumptions 
that he has denied were possible; namely, that theoretical 
moral considerations exist at all. This he assumes when he 
argues that injustice is more profitable than justice.
It is clear at this point that Socrates has accepted 
Thrasymachus' challenge and has defeated him at the 
rhetorical exercise. Thrasymachus' reasoning is inadequate
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and his definitions indefensible. The principles upon which 
he has based his definitions, however, have remained intact. 
Socrates has failed to show that justice is in fact more 
profitable in every way than injustice. The deficiency in 
Socrates' argument in Book I is that he attempts to prove 
that justice is good without first saying what it is. 
Several definitions are considered and rejected, but 
Socrates does not offer one of his own. He only says that 
justice exists as an ideal. Justice is the art which 
assigns to every citizen that which is good for his soul and 
determines the common good of the city. Thrasymachus, 
retains his assertion that these are distinct goods which 
cannot exist in harmony, or even side by side. Socrates has 
failed to defeat egoism by the end of Book I. Rather, he 
argues in the remainder of the Republic for a version of 
Thrasymachus' egoism. He will argue that morality and 
self-interest in fact coincide in the good city.
In Book II Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge Socrates to 
prove that injustice and its effects are always bad and 
justice and its effects are always good. Socrates' role 
changes in Book II from that of "questioner about justice" 
to "teacher about the just." Glaucon and Adeimantus' part in 
this new endeavor is to elaborate Thrasymachus' position 
about the nature of justice so that Socrates can summon his 
best defenses against it. Plato casts Glaucon and 
Adeimantus as moral men. They believe in the ideal of
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justice, so they are authorized to attack it vigorously. 
They attack justice to provoke Socrates to its praise.
Glaucon elaborates Thrasymachus1 position with three 
claims. First, Glaucon argues that to do wrong is naturally 
good and to suffer wrong is naturally bad. Suffering 
injury, however, far exceeds in badness the good gained from 
inflicting it. Therefore those who have experienced both, 
and are unable to avoid being injured while inflicting 
injury, will agree to social arrangements with laws that 
minimize the opportunities for both. These laws define 
justice in the society (II, 359a). Thus justice exists as a 
mean between extremes of human action, the best being to do 
wrong without paying the penalty, and the worst being to 
suffer wrongdoing without the power of revenge. On the 
other hand, an individual who has the power to do wrong and 
avoid injury would be mad to agree to such a contract. His 
agreement would require him to sacrifice the power to act as 
he wants for the protection he already enjoys (II, 359b).
Glaucon's second claim is that individuals practice 
justice against their will, specifically because they lack 
the power to do wrong without penalty. Rather human beings 
should practice injustice, because of "the desire for undue 
gain, which every organism by nature pursues as a good"(II, 
359c). Hence justice may be necessary for human beings but 
it is not always good for them. Social arrangements arise
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from human circumstance and not human nature. This point is 
powerfully illustrated in the Gyges myth (Ilf 359c). Any 
two individuals, just or unjust, would proceed from the 
shepherd's situation exactly as he did. Under those 
circumstances, no one could resist becoming "like a god 
among men" (II, 360c).
Thirdly, Glaucon claims that the life of an unjust man 
would, in fact, be better than that of a just man. Glaucon 
insists that if we imagine the most just and the most unjust 
of human beings "face to face"(II, 360e), it is clear that 
the most unjust individual will have the happier life. Thus 
injustice is more profitable than justice.
With his praise of injustice Adeimantus demands further
that Socrates praise justice per se without including
notions of punishment or reward. Justice per se should not 
be accounted for in terms of what gods or men think is
just.[58] Moreover, Adeimantus reiterates Glaucon's
contention that the universal praise of justice will itself
supply the incentive to praise injustice if the latter can
be mistaken for the former. This, he concludes, leaves only 
two kinds of men who are just by choice, those who
instinctively feel revulsion at their own unjust actions,
and those who abstain from unjust acts because they know 
better (II, 366c-e).
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Socrates offers an alternative view of the origins of 
cities. Socrates agrees with Glaucon and Adeimantus that 
human beings naturally seek after their own good. He also 
agrees with Adeimantus that humans are incapable of meeting 
all their own material needs, specifically because they are 
naturally more suited to some tasks than to others. Hence 
they naturally establish cities for mutual benefit. 
Thrasymachus has argued that the good for individuals 
differs from the good for cities, so justice must be one or 
the other. Socrates argues that these goods are identical 
so that he can examine justice in cities as an easily 
observable example of justice in individuals. Glaucon and 
Adeimantus agree with this strategy (II, 369a). Socrates 
further insists that human beings are naturally disposed to 
do good and not harm to others. So besides protecting the 
weak and supplying material needs, cities also provide an 
environment where the natural human disposition to do good 
to others is fulfilled. This view of cities eliminates 
egoism as a first principle for society.
The development of the ideal city occurs in three 
stages:
1. the rudimentary city-Adeimantus' description;
2. the feverish (luxurious) city-Glaucon's 
description;
3. the good city-Socrates' description;
The rudimentary city originates in human needs. It is based 
on the inability of individuals to meet all their own
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material needs. The rudimentary city allows individuals to 
acquire the necessities of life. Self-interest leads 
individuals to cooperate socially. Everyone in the city
earns a living performing his craft and the differences 
between individuals assure that many different crafts will 
be represented. Furthermore, almost all the work is done 
for others. Each produces according to his capacities and 
receives according to his needs. Through exchanges of goods 
and services the city realizes the advantage of everyone.
The rudimentary city is a place of happiness because every 
member's basic needs are satisfied. Moreover the good of 
self-interest is identified with the common good of the 
city. The rudimentary city is naturally just.
Glaucon argues that the rudimentary city is
unrealistically simple. It cannot supply the luxuries of 
life. Glaucon's city, the feverish city, is characterized 
by unlimited striving. Individuals exercise whatever craft 
or combination of pursuits that proves most lucrative.
Strictly corresponding rewards for goods and services no 
longer exist. This leads to inequality and conflicts, and a 
need for government to define justice and maintain order. 
The feverish city therefore requires education of leaders to 
determine what is just, because justice is no longer 
naturally effected.
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Socrates expands the discussion of the city along his 
own lines. The luxurious, or feverish city, is 
characterized by inequality and scarcity. Its perpetuation 
requires an army and strong government. As the rudimentary 
city was moderate and harmonious, the feverish city reflects 
a constant state of imbalance. Glaucon's city cannot claim 
that it harms no one; its justification lies in the quality 
of life that it provides for its citizens. For protection 
its army must be like trained dogs, merciless to enemies, 
disinterested and even harsh to strangers, and gentle to 
citizens. To these ends the army is thoroughly educated in 
virtue.
Because the character of the ruling class will
determine the way of life in the city, Socrates proceeds 
with a discussion of the education of the guardians. Proper 
education is necessary to cultivate "spiritedness" in the 
guardians. Spiritedness is seen as a characteristic 
indifference to life which overcomes the desire for goods, 
for the sake of higher virtues. The guardians' education
must transform their courage into civil courage, without the 
motivation of realizing the usual spoils of victory in the 
process. The guardians must be educated in moderation.
The guardians are more than an additional class of
craftsmen. Others serve primarily to satisfy desires.
Spiritedness, however, requires indifference to desire. The
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guardians' services cannot be compensated by the usual 
means. Hence, spiritedness must exist beyond the economic 
system of the city. Indeed the city can survive if and only 
if there are those who will enthusiastically sacrifice and 
die for it.
The end of the education of the guardians is a love of 
noble things, especially moderation and civil courage. 
Since justice comes from moderation and courage in proper 
combination, it becomes especially important for them. But 
a good city is not part of a community of cities. Therefore 
if a parallel between the individual and the city is to be 
maintained we must understand the virtues of individuals in 
terms other than justice. Hence the discussion of the eros 
of the beautiful takes the place of justice in explaining 
the essential differences between the city and the robber 
band.
The difference between justice and the eros which is 
the end of the guardian's education is illustrated in 
Socrates' discussion of rulers. Besides protecting 
citizens, rulers must have a calculated love for the city 
because justice as a common good is not chosen for its own 
sake. The guardians' education instills a love of beautiful 
things, the most important of which are intangible 
qualities. Thus they love simplicity, harmony, courage, 
moderation, and reason. Furthermore they love these
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qualities for themselves, beyond simply cultivating 
admirable traits in their behavior. Members of the guardian 
class who best love the intangibles are the best candidates 
for philosopher-kings.
Foremost among these intangibles are the Forms. Love 
of the Forms finally distinguishes the philosopher-kings 
from others in the guardian class.[59] Because of this 
highest love, the philosopher-kings not only do not 
distinguish between their interests and those of the city, 
in fact they cannot make this distinction. Because of their 
preoccupation with the Forms, it is impossible for the 
philosopher-kings to act other than altruistically.
By 427c the establishment of Socrates' polis is 
complete. In this city rulers rule for the advantage of the 
ruled. This is the opposite of Thrasymachus1 description 
from Book I, but consistent with both Socrates and 
Thrasymachus1 understanding of art in the strict sense. 
Moreover, Socrates has elaborated a city where philosophy 
can be a public activity because it does not contradict the 
authority of the regime. The guardians will be moderate in 
the name of the city-state. This is analagous to Socrates' 
demand that self-interested desires be moderated by 
individuals in the name of education in philosophy. If this 
is impossible then Socrates' polis is impossible, because 
then philosophy must remain a private activity, and rule
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must be administered by the prejudices of self-interest; 
that is, informed by egoism. Socrates assumes without proof 
that individuals with the potential to become 
philosopher-kings as he has described them do in fact exist. 
If this assumption is mistaken, there will be no 
philosopher-kings, no ideal city, and no justice.
Before looking for justice within the completed city, 
however, Socrates changes the terms of the discussion. By 
427c the question has shifted from "What is justice, and is 
it good for men?" to "What good thing is justice?" Socrates 
set out to prove that justice was choiceworthy for its own 
sake and not merely on account of its consequences. Now he 
declares that the question is whether in order to be happy 
one must possess justice. But we still do not know if 
justice is advantageous to society. Socrates states at 427e 
that if the city they have theorized is good, then it must 
possess all of the virtues included in the discussion thus 
far: wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice. But even in
the good city justice is difficult to find. It soon proves, 
however, to be the principle which has guided the founding 
of the city from the outset. Justice consists in everyone 
performing the tasks for which they are naturally suited, 
and in minding their own business (IV, 433a). Thus justice 
was operative in the rudimentary city but lost in the 
feverish city. Furthermore justice is "the power by which 
all these others came into being"(IV, 433b). Justice exists
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as a Form, and characterizes good cities and moderate men, 
but Socrates does not establish any connection that makes 
the former a necessary or sufficient condition for the 
latter, or that shows the latter exists as an instance of a 
larger reality that includes the former.
From the problems with the relationship of justice in
the polis to justice in the Form it follows that rulers do
not have sufficient reason to make the sacrifices to become
philosophers, and philosophers lack sufficient motivation to
rule. One task of education in general and education to
philosophy in particular is to make explicit the natural
insufficiency of individuals apart from the polis.
Education explains moral responsibility within the polis.
In this sense philosophers are best educated, and they are
the best candidates for rule. Socrates observes that,
Unless the philosophers'rule as kings or those now 
called kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately 
philosophize, and political power and philosophy 
coincide in the same place, while the many natures 
now making their way to either apart from the 
other are by necessity excluded, there is no rest 
from ills for the cities (V, 473d).
As noted above, Socrates assumes without proof that a 
philosopher-king is a possibility for a ruler. But even if 
his assumption is correct, problems remain. The Myth of the 
Cave liberates selected individuals from the need to exploit 
cities to satisfy their appetites and desires. Those who 
have seen the light of knowledge outside the cave and return
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know that the others are slaves and they are free. These
men want nothing from the city, and that solves the problem
of where to find disinterested rulers.
But it also becomes clear that philosophers do not 
want to be rulers and that they must be compelled. 
Compulsion is necessary since rhetoric cannot 
deceive philosophers. Now the tables are turned. 
Previously it appeared that the philosophers are 
anxious to rule and must persuade a recalcitrant 
populace. In the investigation of the philosophic 
nature it has by accident, as it were, emerged 
that philosophers want nothing from the city and 
that their contemplative activity is perfectly 
engrossing, leaving neither time nor interest for 
ruling. So, if the philosophers are to rule, it 
must be the city that forces them to do so; and 
it is in the philosopher's interest to keep the 
knowledge of their kingly skills from the people.
It is a perfect circle. The people must be 
persuaded to accept the philosophers; but the 
philosophers must be compelled to persuade the 
people to compel them to rule. And who would do 
that?[60]
In the final analysis, Thrasymachus and Glaucon's 
original question about rulers remains unanswered, and 
Socrates' problem remains unsolved. Citizens obey good 
rulers, and that is clearly to their advantage. But it 
remains unclear whether it is to the ruler's advantage to 
care for the citizenry, except in terms of the ruler's 
self-interest. As a founder of a polis. Socrates wants his 
city and its rulers to be just. That position does not 
prove, however, that it is good for them to be just. These 
problems prohibit the good city from becoming a reality, and 
prevent Socrates from repudiating Thrasymachus' position 
that in society might makes right for rulers and their
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self-interest.
In the Gorgias. Socrates repudiates the egoism of 
Gorgias and Polus, and rejects the extreme egoism of 
Callicles. In the Republic. Socrates refutes Thrasymachus 
initially, then proceeds to construct a polis in speech 
against the elaboration of Thrasymachus' position by Glaucon 
and Adeimantus. Socrates' theoretical polis attempts to
establish relationships between rulers and citizens that 
remain free of self-interest. The philosopher-king as 
Socrates describes him cannot act other than altruistically. 
Socrates offers the philosopher-king as proof that altruism
is a possibility for human beings, and to repudiate the
egoism of Callicles and Thrasymachus.
Plato considers the Sophists' objections seriously.
Besides advocating egoism, the Sophists based their
teachings in skepticism, a position opposite the world view 
that included immutable, knowable Forms. Socrates and Plato 
differed in their approaches from the Sophists because they 
began from the belief that absolute knowledge of moral 
standards was possible and necessary both for individuals 
and societies. Socrates and Plato imposed upon themselves 
to produce positive philosophical investigations of moral 
issues based on these beliefs. Thus Socrates imagines an 
ideal city-state wherein the best of moderate men rule 
justly, that is, for the benefit of everyone as indistinct
from themselves. The good city holds the potential for
happiness, that is, for maximizing the improvement of souls 
all around. But Socrates' polis remains theoretical because 
the best candidates for rule may not exist, and according to 
Bloom, would also be the least likely to participate. But
Plato's failure in the Republic does not eclipse the
vitality of the larger venture of pitting absolute knowable 
standards against the ethical relativism that allows egoism 
to flourish. Indeed in the Crito, Socrates argues finally 
that men have no social or political relationships that 
transcend their responsibility to obey laws that reflect 
absolute moral values.[61] Remaining to face the sentence 
that the Athenian court decreed constitutes Socrates' final
rejection of egoism.
4 .0  EGOISM AND JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE
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4.1 Rawls' Theory And Egoism:
John Rawls is a contemporary moral philosopher in the 
Platonic tradition. Although Rawls rejects egoism as a 
viable view of human nature and first principle of society, 
he does so with little discussion. He offers instead a 
theory of justice based on individual morality and a social 
contract.
John Rawls theory of justice is a deontological moral 
theory emphasizing right actions, actions showing respect 
and concern for persons. This respect and concern 
characterizes the two principles of justice chosen in what 
Rawls calls an "original position," and is consistent with 
common notions of social cooperation. The principles of 
justice provide a basic structure for society that fairly 
distributes what he calls "primary goods” among its members. 
Rawls' principles are justified because if everyone did not 
have the equality of First Principle primary goods, for 
example, then some would find themselves without those goods 
in society and society could be unjust. Rawls seeks a just 
society, one which takes individuals and their rights 
seriously.
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Rawls argues that his two principles of justice would 
provide the fairest distribution of the benefits of social 
cooperation. These benefits Rawls calls primary goods. 
Primary goods are those goods that persons would want and 
need to realize their individual life plans, whatever else 
they might want. Primary goods are objective measures of 
the well-being of individuals. They impart substance to the 
principles by defining the advantages to which the 
principles will refer. The principles chosen in the 
original position reflect each rational person's attempt to 
most fully realize by his choice that which he expects to 
gain by his involvement in society.
In his theory Rawls includes egoistic conceptions in a 
list of possible alternative principles for organizing the 
basic structure of society. From the outset Rawls assumes 
that the presence of others precludes individuals from 
realizing everything they want. Even without total 
indulgence, however, the goods and services of society do 
not distribute themselves. Egoism could serve to determine 
that distribution.
Rawls recognizes three types of egoism, first person 
dictatorship, free rider, and general.[62] In the first 
person dictatorship Rawls imagines an arrangement in which 
everyone serves the interests of one individual. The laws 
of this society would require that everyone join with the
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dictator to further his interests, regardless of the 
consequences for themselves or the society. In the free
rider conception of egoism, everyone in society acts 
according to organizing principles adopted by the society
except for the free rider, who exempts himself as he
chooses. If the laws of society interfere with the free
rider's interests, he ignores them. He remains above the 
law and immune to its restraints. In general or 
"free-fot-all" egoism, recalling Hobbes' state of nature, 
everyone advances his own interest as he is able.
Rawls asserts that rational individuals would never
agree to social cooperation based on a first person dictator
or a free rider other than themselves. That leaves the
free-for-all, where everyone serves his own interests as
much as circumstances allow. This situation would produce a
society in extreme disarray, Or more accurately, a
non-society. General egoism coincides with Hobbes' state of
nature and all of its non-social consequences for
individuals. Rawls prefers society to the state of nature.
Now obviously no one can obtain everything he 
wants; the mere existence of other persons 
prevents this. The absolutely best for any man is 
that everyone else should join with him in 
furthering his conception of the good, whatever it 
turns out to be. Or failing this, that all others 
are required to act justly but that he is 
authorized to exempt himself as he pleases. Since 
other persons will never agree to such terms of 
association these forms should be rejected." [63]
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Because Rawls considers egoism incompatable with the 
moral point of view, it can exist as a challenge to any 
conception of justice but not as an alternative. Egoism, in 
fact, characterizes the point of no agreement in Rawls 
theory, and like Hobbes' state of nature, the circumstance 
of no social cooperation.
Rawls does not offer explicit arguments against general 
or "free-for-all" egoism. Instead, he offers a complete 
theory of distributive justice as an elaborate alternative 
to egoism. There are, however, aspects of Rawls' analysis 
that argue against egoism. Section 4.2 will consider Rawls' 
theory of justice and his rejection of egoism.
4.2 Rawls' Theory Of Justice As A Denial Of Egoism:
Rawls offers an heuristic for choosing principles to 
govern the distribution of social benefits consistent with 
the moral point of view. This hypothetical device he calls 
the original position. It also includes a veil of ignorance 
and a choice following from mutually disinterested 
rationality. The original position in Rawls' theory of 
justice is analagous to the state of nature of traditional 
social contract theory, or at least to a pre-contractual 
situation. It is not, however, intended to explain an 
actual or realizable state of affairs. "Nothing resembling 
it (the original position) need ever take place, although we
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can by deliberately following the constraints it expresses 
simulate the reflections of the parties."[64] The original 
position is offered as a purely hypothetical situation 
imagined to lead to a particular notion of justice in 
society, namely justice as fairness. This hypothetical 
aspect of the original position is one of its essential 
features.
The veil of ignorance guarantees that rational, moral 
men choosing principles will select principles of justice; 
specifically Rawls' principles of justice as fairness. Thus 
the members of society choose together, consistent with the 
demands of everyone considering everyone else. The veil 
insures an equality of ignorance about information 
extraneous to the moral point of view. The strength of the 
veil is that persons in the original position would have no 
basis for bargaining, and thus no means to tailor the 
principles to any individual's advantage while excluding the 
rest. The veil allows choosers information about the 
circumstances of justice and the general facts of society. 
But no one in the original position would be allowed 
information that was irrelevant from a moral standpoint. 
That is, no chooser would have specific information about 
exactly who he was to be in the society, what his social 
status might be, or which of the succeeding generations of 
the society he would belong to. Furthermore, he would not 
know the extent or nature of his natural abilities, the
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particulars of his individual life-plan, or even be aware of 
his personal conception of the good. Likewise he would 
remain oblivious to information about his psychological 
makeup, his willingness to take certain risks, for example.
The veil of ignorance thus insures that the original 
position allows a choice between moral, rational, benevolent 
individuals, and that the principles agreed to in that 
situation would be fair. The veil assures respect and 
concern for individuals. Persons choosing principles would 
not know enough about themselves to choose specific 
principles or bargain effectively to their exclusive 
advantage. Nor would they provide an attractive prospect 
for anyone else. These individuals not only do not know 
what would benefit them specifically, they also have nothing 
anyone else wants. Rawls' system seeks the highest possible 
index of primary goods for everyone, and disregards 
comparative circumstances, except for the restrictions of 
the Difference Principle. Choices of principles in these 
circumstances should always yield principles of justice 
because each chooser should be convinced by the same general 
arguments. Furthermore the same principles should be chosen 
because the information and restrictions remain the same for 
all.
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The other essential feature of the original position is
the mutually disinterested rationality. Mutually
disinterested rationality requires persons in the original
position to be concerned with their individual interests.
Rawls' mutually disinterested rationality allows choosers to
know what the primary goods of society are and to realize
that, to achieve their life-plans, they want these goods for
themselves. Individuals are, then, capable of choosing just
principles in the original position, even when restricted by
the veil of ignorance. By employing a mutually
disinterested rationality, Rawls avoids controversial
assumptions about human motivation while guaranteeing that
his two principles will be chosen in the original position.
In the original position, with its essential features, the
particular circumstance is imagined from which Rawls'
principles of justice as fairness would proceed.
The concept of the original position, as I shall 
refer to it, is that of the most philosophically 
favored interpretation of this initial choice 
situation for the purposes of a theory of justice.
[65]
The problem for individuals in the original position is not 
so much how to deal with moral 'givens'; it is rather how 
to formulate reasonable and generally acceptable principles 
that rational individuals might reasonably expect from a 
moral point of view.
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Rawls attempts to define the original position as a 
status quo circumstance in which the agreements reached are 
fair.[66] The people involved represent themselves and their 
expectations and the resulting principles would not be 
affected by considerations irrelevant from the moral point 
of view. Rawls argues that the principles that he offers 
are the principles that moral men would choose given the 
situation of the original position as he describes it.
The original position in Rawls' system is set against 
the background of specific circumstances and the best
available information concerning the general facts of 
society. The three "circumstances of justice”, as Rawls 
calls them, are the factors that inspire individuals to seek 
a social contract. "Thus one can say that the circumstances 
of justice obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons 
put forward conflicting claims to the division of social 
advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity."[67]
Persons in the original position are allowed to know that 
the circumstances of justice obtain, and they are also
allowed general facts of society. This information is 
relevant for a choice of principles consistent with a moral 
point of view.
The first circumstance of justice recognizes the
relative scarcity of goods in the world. We do not enjoy 
the happy circumstance of having whatever we want whenever
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we want. This circumstance motivates individuals to move
from a state of nature to realizing the benefits of
cooperation by social contract. Further, the chances of 
realizing individual expectations in society improves over a 
state of nature, because mutual cooperation helps remove 
scarcities.
The second circumstance of justice recognizes that 
people entering into a social arrangement have approximately 
equal power and share generally similar needs and common 
interests. This circumstance further enhances the 
desirability of social cooperation, because a collaboration 
among persons with similar capacities for tyranny, for
example, would discourage one individual or group of 
participants from dominating the others. Also the notion of 
common needs and interests makes the cooperative enterprise 
possible, since a general agreement about priorities leads 
to basic principles acceptable to all concerned. The 
individuals will still be concerned, however, with how they 
might realize an adequate share of primary goods,
distributed as the benefits of the cooperation. Thus it is 
reasonable to presume that the individuals in the society 
would be rational. They would also have expectations which 
could be realized by more rather than fewer primary goods. 
From this it follows that conflicts of interest will arise 
as persons compete for the goods necessary to their 
individual life plans. In short, persons involved in the
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contract would not be indifferent to the distribution of the 
benefits of cooperation. Interested individuals would help 
restrict unfair domination by a majority in society, much as 
the circumstance of similar capacities and common interests 
precludes the unjust domination by a minority.
The third circumstance of justice recognizes the 
fallibility of individuals as human beings. Rawls states:
 ̂I assume that the parties take no interest in one 
another's interests. I also suppose that men 
suffer from various shortcomings of knowledge, 
thought, and judgment. Their knowledge is 
necessarily incomplete, their powers of reasoning, 
memory, and attention are always limited, and 
their judgment is likely to be distorted by 
anxiety, bias, and a preoccupation with their own 
affairs. Some of these defects spring from moral 
faults, from selfishness and negligence; but to a 
large degree, they are simply part of man's 
natural situation. As a consequence individuals 
not only have different plans of life, but there 
exists a diversity of philosophical and religious 
belief, and of political and social doctrine.[68]
Besides realizing the benefits for individuals in a social 
cooperation, this circumstance underscores the necessity of 
attaining a satisfactory system, to enhance and insure 
individual life plans and to prevent as much as possible any 
compromising of just expectations from human frailty.
In addition to the three circumstances of justice Rawls 
allows to persons choosing in the original position access 
to selected additional information concerning the general 
facts of society. These facts would include the most modern 
and comprehensive political and economic theories. The
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latest data from the social sciences, specifically
psychology and sociology, would also be available. Choosers 
would be aware of information about the habits, desires, and 
motivations of man qua man, as well as studies of collective 
social arrangements. Also, persons in the original position 
would be allowed the best available information about the 
amount, kind, availability, and potential for exhaustion of 
society's natural resources. This requirement assures that 
the choice of principles is rational and fair for succeeding 
generations of the society, not only for the one in which 
the choice is made. This becomes important for the veil of 
ignorance restriction about which generation an individual 
chooser will eventually belong to.
Rawls' principles are chosen to order the conflicting 
claims of individuals on the relatively scarce goods
described by the circumstances of justice. This ordering 
shall be done fairly. Rawls offers an analysis of what he 
understands justice to be. His principles must be 
consistent with a notion of moral fairness, and also must 
reflect the reasonable expectations of rational moral
individuals in the original position. To accomplish this 
Rawls insists that the principles chosen meet five 
constraints. Not surprisingly, these constraints rule out 
egoism as a choice of principles.
Page 91
1* The principles chosen should be general. This
condition assures that the principles will order society 
generally, without references to proper names or "rigged 
definite descriptions."[69] Actually this constraint should 
not be a problem for persons in the original position 
because of the veil of ignorance. Without the specific 
information about who he was to be, a chooser would not be 
able to prejudice the choice of principles to his advantage. 
The point here is that generality is a distinct condition
that assures the principles would always hold for any 
succeeding generation of a well-ordered society. It also
rules out egoism.
2. The pxipjg-igl.es, sjiQuld b& universally applied. 
"They must hold for everyone by virtue of their being moral 
persons."[70] This condition assures that the principles 
will apply fairly to all. It also insures against selective 
compliance and rules out group tyrannies.
3. The principles must be public. This condition 
assures that the principles will be known, understood, and 
generally accepted by everyone involved. This stabilizes
the social contract because the parties in the original
position could evaluate different conceptions of justice 
that are in the common interest. It follows, according to 
Rawls, that the conception of justice as fairness would
still be chosen, given the restrictions of the veil of
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ignorance.
4. The principles must order conflicting claims. The 
principles thus determine legitimate claims for moral 
persons. This prevents "free-for-all" egoism, reminiscent
of the Hobbesian state of nature.
5. The principles must also be final. The principles 
embody the de-ontological force of the system. They reflect 
moral standards that everyone recognizes. There is no prior 
teleological 'given' that the principles are the means to 
realize. The principles of justice, in short, are not
subsumable to any higher authority or more important 
consideration. They specify all of the considerations 
relevant from the moral point of view, and resolutions of 
conflicting claims consistent with them are therefore 
decisive. "There are no higher standards to which arguments 
in support of claims can be addressed; reasoning 
successfully from these principles is conclusive."[71]
Although the original position is a purely hypothetical 
situation, for Rawls it yields principles that moral, 
rational individuals recognize as reasonable and just. That 
is, the original position expresses the just limits and fair
aims of social cooperation. Rawls concludes that the
original position requires the choice of principles of 
justice, specifically, his two principles of justice as 
fairness. The first principle states that all persons shall
Page 93
enjoy the equality of basic rights, and the economic worth 
of those rights, as long as they do not compromise the 
similar basic rights of others. The second states that 
inequalities in the sharing of remaining special goods shall 
benefit everyone, especially the least advantaged. Rawls 
claims that these principles would maximize primary goods 
for individuals in a just society.
Rawls insists on a lexical ordering of his two 
principles. The primary goods guaranteed by the first 
principle maintain a priority over those covered by the 
second, or Difference principle. Rawls would not allow 
tradeoffs of first principle primary goods for a greater
share of remaining primary goods. For example, Rawls would 
prohibit trading basic freedom for a high-paying job as a
slave. Rawls' theory takes seriously the notion of
individual worth, so he insures that fair principles proceed 
from the original position.
The principles of justice as fairness structure society 
from the moral point of view and provide an environment 
where persons compete fairly for primary goods. The 
principles allow individuals to make claims upon each other 
within a framework of rules. A just society, founded on 
principles of justice, helps its members realize rational 
life plans. Applying principles of justice, especially the 
Difference principle, Rawls assumes that society can assign
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"an expectation of well being" to individuals in 
society.[72] This expectation defines individuals' life 
prospects and gives direction to individual striving. The 
expectation depends on the distribution of rights and duties 
through the basic structure. Rawls adapts Josiah Royce's 
definition of an individual as a "human life lived according 
to a rational plan."[73] Life plans are rational if they are 
consistent with principles of rational choice when applied 
to the relevant features of individual situations. 
Moreover, rational plans include any that an individual 
would choose in view of relevant facts and consequences. 
The principles chosen in the original position encourage and 
provide an individual's best choice of life plans. Since 
these criteria for rational life plans include everyone in 
society, Rawls' principles of justice assure treatment as 
equals where individual life plans are concerned. This 
assurance is an ultimate reflection of the moral point of 
view.
Rawls' original position includes formal constraints on 
the concept of right for a just society. As noted above, 
the formal constraints exclude notions of egoism as 
possibilities for choice in the original position. The 
first constraint, the generality condition, prohibits 
manipulation of the system by a particular egoist. 
Dictators and free riders cannot exempt themselves from 
principles that order society in a general way for two
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reasons. First, unless the dictator or free rider was 
assured that he would continue with that status in the 
society, he could not rationally choose to include that 
possibility for others. Second, each case requires 
individual identification so the egoist can choose 
principles that allow him to assume a specific role in 
society. The generality constraint requires that the 
principles chosen order the society without recognition or 
preference for specific individuals, groups, or generations. 
The fourth constraint, that principles will fairly order 
conflicting claims, prevents the general "free-for-all" 
egoism that characterizes Hobbes' state of nature. In a 
just society everyone can and ought to advance claims to 
realize his life plan, even though conflicts will arise when 
they do. The ordering condition provides for fair 
adjudication of competing claims without determining which 
are more important than others. This prevents the moral 
breakdowns that could otherwise occur.
4.3 Rawls' Implicit Refutation Of Egoism:
There are three kinds of arguments for the moral point 
of view in Rawls' theory. The first is the elaborate and 
plausible theory of justice with which he is primarily 
concerned in his book. This has been explained in section
4.2 above. Suffice it to say that the attractiveness and 
moral force of Rawls' theory, in contrast with Hobbes'
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analysis, would have to be viewed as a giant mistake by an 
ethical egoist. Two other, more subtle, arguments against 
ethical egoism also appear in Rawls' book. In section 9 of 
A Theory of Justice. Rawls discusses the relationship 
between moral theory and moral experience. In sections 63, 
65, and 66, Rawls details the moral development of persons 
and argues for the consistency of that development as a 
result of his theory of "justice as fairness."
In section 9 Rawls briefly discusses the nature of
moral theory. As we might expect, he assumes that
Each person beyond a certain age and possessed of 
the requisite intellectual capacity develops a 
sense of justice under normal social 
circumstances.[74]
Rawls argues that by the time most individuals face 
experiences in their lives that require moral choice, they 
have developed their moral sensibilities. They judge the 
actions of others, and they act themselves, in accordance
with these notions.
But individuals cannot achieve a sense of justice by
simply listing the moral judgments they are prepared to
render.
Rather what is required is a formulation of a set 
of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs 
and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us 
to make these judgments with their supporting
reasons were we to apply these principles 
conscientiously and intelligently.[75]
Page 97
Common sense notions of morality cannot serve by themselves 
to inform a sense of justice, even for moral persons. In 
fact, "considered judgments," (as Rawls calls them), those 
moral judgments in which individual moral capacities are 
accurately displayed, will likely be excessively influenced 
by self-interest. Thus they would lead to inconsistent and 
conflicting views of what counts as morally correct action. 
To promote a sense of justice for a society of individuals 
with minimum interference from such restricted perspectives, 
Rawls argues the need for principles that go beyond 
individual moral sensibilities and common experience. 
Indeed the thoughtful moral life as Rawls characterizes it 
in Section 9, challenges our considered judgments with
careful attention to a moral theory. For Rawls, moral
theory and considered judgments go hand in hand, each
reinforcing and validating the other. Rawls challenges us 
to understand our moral lives in these terms.
In sections 63, 65, and 66, Rawls details the moral 
development of persons in a just society. In section 63, 
Rawls argues that the central, private benefit for persons 
participating in a just society involves realizing their 
individual life-plans. The realization of each individual's 
life-plan determines his definition of the good. 
Furthermore if his life-plan is rational, then his
conception of the good is likewise rational, and his 
fulfillment of rational goals will bring him happiness.
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In section 65, Rawls discusses what he calls the
"Aristotelian Principle." This principle states that,
Other things being equal, human beings enjoy the 
exercise of their realized capacities and that 
this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is 
realized, or the greater its complexity.[76]
Rawls then uses this principle to define primary goods. 
Primary goods thus become those goods that permit human 
beings to develop and exercise their realized capacities 
according to the Aristotelian Principle.
In section 66, Rawls defines a good person as a person
of moral worth,
one who has to a higher degree than average the 
broadly based features of moral character that it 
is rational for the persons in the original 
position to want in one another.[77]
Since the principles chosen in the original position are the
same for all, according to Rawls, then choosers will
participate in and enjoy the society most when they know
that others in the society share the moral characteristics
that they want to include in society, and which they
themselves would express. In a society whose basic
structure is determined by persons choosing just principles
in the original position, the best circumstance occurs when
everyone can realize rational life plans according to the
Aristotelian Principle, and most importantly, when they can
participate fully in a society peopled with other moral
persons like themselves who share a social vision of mutual
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cooperation and concern.
5 .0  EGOISM AND SOCIAL COOPERATION
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5.1 Reply To The Modern Egoists:
Egoism currently enjoys wide acceptance as an 
explanation of human nature. If self-interest informs human 
action, then information about how to realize self-interest 
becomes a valuable means to individual success. Thus we 
understand the popular "self-help" literature. Furthermore, 
ethical egoism yields a particular character for society 
when it serves as a first principle. This character is well 
illustrated by Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of 
Book II in the Republic, and by Hobbes' thorough explication 
in the Leviathan. But ethical egoism must finally be 
rejected as philosophically unsound. Egoism cannot explain 
many actions that are common to rational individuals, so it 
has no value as an hypothesis about human nature. Nor can 
ethical egoism serve as an adequate first principle for 
society, because the society based on egoism is an unnatural 
collection of individuals who are preoccupied with 
self-interest. This view actually prohibits meaningful 
social cooperation from occuring.
Significantly, the modern egoists imply that their 
programs offer morally correct options to achieve individual 
happiness. Their programs are most effective at allowing 
individuals to get what they know they want. At the same 
time, however, these means to individual happiness must
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remain free of moral evaluation. The weak version of 
ethical egoism allows for benevolent action for rational 
individuals; the strong version does not. When the modern 
egoists argue for the weak version of ethical egoism, they 
force the conclusion that many of the methods they advocate 
are patently immoral, because they depend on an individual 
point of view. By retaining moral concepts, the modern 
egoists license this immoral action, because it helps 
realize their self-interest. The strong version regards 
egoism as a non-moral position, but this position discounts 
much common human activity as irrational. Moral concepts 
help explain common human activity that is not 
self-interested.
When the modern egoists feel compelled to justify their 
positions on moral grounds, when they argue for a weak 
version of ethical egoism, they demonstrate a fundamental 
confusion reminiscent of the confusion Socrates uncovered in 
Gorgias and Polus. That is, they propound the weak version 
of ethical egoism but commit themselves to the consequences 
of the strong version. For example, they defend 
self-interested action as morally correct without first 
deciding whether morally correct action is possible for 
self-interested individuals. But if they accept the 
consequences of the strong version, then justifications of 
self-interested action that use moral terms are meaningless. 
On the other hand, if they propound the weak version, they
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advocate immoral actions for the results they seek. We can 
only conjecture whether or not those who offer the weak 
version subscribe to the strong version that their positions 
imply. Those who do support the strong version, however, 
reveal their nihilism, and a cynicism about human nature 
reminiscent of Callicles'. In either case ethical egoism in 
general, and these modern egoists in particular, offer 
little to discussions of human nature and the moral point of 
view. Hobbes argues in the Leviathan that rational 
individuals naturally act for their own good only. 
Benevolent action is not a possibility for rational men. 
Apparently benevolent acts are instances of disguised 
self-seeking based on m a n ’s prudence in the face of social 
chaos. In general our modern authors share this forcefully 
expressed view of human nature.
To overcome an "inferiority complex," a uniquely 
individual malady, Norman Peale urges individuals to realize 
that God attends them singly. Peale's concept of "applied 
Christianity," in which individuals shape their lives and 
realize happiness for themselves, suggests that they do so 
naturally. But his analysis ignores human and Christian 
acts of profound selflessness, Peale's ethical egoism 
creates a tension with his religious beliefs that his 
analysis in The Power of Positive Thinking does not mediate. 
Peale offers the following individual success story that 
illustrates the tension between positive thinking and
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benevolent action:
To build up feelings of self-confidence the practice 
of suggesting confidence concepts to your mind is 
very effective. If your mind is obsessed by thoughts 
of insecurity and inadequacy it is, of course, due to 
the fact that such ideas have dominated your thinking 
over a long period of time. Another and more 
positive pattern of ideas must be given to the mind, 
and that is accomplished by repetitive suggestion of 
confidence ideas. In the busy activities of daily 
existence thought disciplining is required if you are 
to re-educate the mind and make of it a 
power-producing plant. It is possible, even in the 
midst of your daily work, to drive confident thoughts 
into consciousness . . . One icy winter morning (a
friend) called for me at a hotel in a Midwestern city 
to take me about thirty-five miles to another town to 
fill a lecture engagement. We got into his car and 
started off at a rather high rate of speed on the 
slippery road* He was going a little faster than I 
thought reasonable, and I reminded him that we had 
plenty of time and suggested that we take it easy. 
"Don't let my driving worry you", he replied, "I used 
to be filled with all kinds of insecurities myself, 
but I got over them. I was afraid of everything. I 
feared an automobile trip or an airplane flight; and 
if any of my family went away I worried until they 
returned. I always went around with a feeling that 
something was going to happen, and it made my life 
miserable. I was saturated with inferiority and 
lacked confidence. This state of mind reflected 
itself in my business and I wasn't doing very well. 
But I hit upon a wonderful plan which knocked all 
these insecurity feelings out of my mind, and now I 
live with a feeling of confidence, not only in myself 
but in life generally.[78]
Peale explains that the "wonderful plan" involved embracing 
positive religious slogans as if they applied personally. 
But the driver's resolution of his "inferiority complex" 
overlooks the passenger's legitimate safety concerns. 
Recalling his final sentence, we wonder how long it will be 
before our driver slides (self-confidently) into an oncoming 
car, driven perhaps by another whose positive thinking
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allows him also to ignore a prudent regard for himself, his
passengers, and others on the road. Peale offers no
solution to this problem. He leaves us to speculate about
the relationship of self-confidence to good judgment. Nor
does he reveal how he resolved his own apprehension (perhaps
with a prayer) or if he rode with the driver again. Instead
Peale concludes,
This plan used by my friend is a very wise one. By 
filling his mind with affirmations of the presence, 
support, and help of God, he had actually changed his 
thought-processes. He put an end to the domination 
of his long-held sense of insecurity. His potential
powers were set free.[79]
In this instructive example, Peale analyzes a common
human situation in terms of the driver of the car. The 
driver's actions show total disregard for his own safety and 
the safety of others as a subtle but important manifestation 
of his self-interest. Acting self-interestedly, even in 
this seemingly innocuous way, necessarily includes immoral 
consequences of endangerment that he cannot avoid. By
violating the legitimate safety concerns of himself and 
others he clearly illustrates the bad morality of
self-interested action, in this case. Based on the 
legitimate safety concerns of everyone, including himself,
Peale's friend should have remained insecure.
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Gail Sheehy's book also implies that acts of 
benevolence are unproductive and harmful if they threaten 
individual "survival" in life crises. For Sheehy, the 
important thing is to recognize the inevitability of change 
and to respond positively to the marker events. Thus 
individuals survive the inevitable swirl of events that 
affect their lives. Individuals can use Passages to prepare 
for and profit from change, however drastic. This approach 
also illustrates the bad moral character of self-interested 
action. Enduring life changes requires that individuals
ignore the legitimate concerns of others, and finally of
themselves. What does it matter if change is good or bad, 
welcomed or feared, constructive or destructive? Since 
change is inevitable, individuals can only prepare with a 
view toward saving themselves. But this approach includes a 
choice that may or may not be their own. That is, 
self-interest in this case could be determined by someone 
other than the self.
Dr. Wayne Dyer characterizes benevolent acts simply
and cynically. Let us examine Dr. Dyer's remarkable
analysis of justice:
If the world were so organized that everything had to 
be fair, no living creature could survive for a day.
The birds would be forbidden to eat worms, and
everyone's self-interest would have to be served .
We are conditioned to look for justice in life and 
when it doesn't appear we tend to feel anger, 
anxiety, or frustration. Actually, it would be 
equally productive to search for the fountain of
youth, or some such myth. Justice does not exist.
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It never has, and it never will. The world is simply 
not put together that way. Robins eat worms. That's 
not fair to the worms. Spiders eat flies. That's 
not fair to the flies. Cougars kill coyotes. 
Coyotes kill badgers. Badgers kill mice. Mice kill 
bugs. Bugs . . .  You have only to look at nature 
to realize there is no justice in the world. 
Tornados, floods, tidal waves, draughts, all are 
unfair. It is a mythological concept, this justice 
business. The world and the people in it go on being 
unfair every day. You can choose to be happy or 
unhappy, but it has nothing to do with the lack of 
justice you see around you. This is not a sour view 
of humanity and the world, but rather an accurate 
report of what the world is like . . . Justice is
simply a concept that has almost no applicability, 
particularly as it pertains to your own choices about 
fulfillment and happiness.[80]
Dyer succinctly presents his version of ethical egoism and 
immediately becomes mired in the inconsistencies of his 
position. He begins by arguing that moral acts between 
human beings are impossible and justice as a moral concept 
is mythological because similar relationships do not exist 
between animals in nature. In fact, they eat each other. 
This observation, although true, is irrelevant to the issue 
he wants to address; namely, whether or not justice or any 
moral concept can exist and inform human action. Presumably 
Dr. Dyer could argue further that human beings eat cows, 
and that's unfair to the cows. But he stops his rambling 
before it becomes philosophically interesting; that is, 
before he considers an example relevant to questions of 
justice. He does not, for example, argue that strong human 
beings sometimes eat weak human beings, and that's unfair to 
the weak. This example would provide a confirming instance
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of his hypothesis about justice. Rather he dwells on 
relationships between animals in nature, not because 
cannibalism among humans is uncommon or even unusual, which 
it is, but because human cannibalism remains in some sense 
morally unacceptable to rational individuals. Nonetheless 
from his irrelevant examples of animals and random weather 
disturbances he concludes that moral concepts have no 
relevance for actions between human beings. This confused
thinking pervades Dyer's works and finally renders them
useless. To argue, therefore, that justice exists only 
conceptually assumes that men, like animals and storms, are 
naturally incapable of benevolent actions in any case, so 
the language of moral terms is at best frivolous and at 
worst a sinister (if meaningless) sham. This sense of
morality also serves to justify the advantages offered in 
Egospeak and Body Language.
Robert Ringer's egoism represents the strong version. 
According to Ringer, "all people act in their own
self-interest all the time."[81] Benevolent action among 
rational human beings is impossible. For Ringer the
question is not whether one chooses to act selfishly or 
unselfishly, but whether one chooses to be rationally or 
irrationally selfish.
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This position includes remarkable implications for
friendships between human beings. Ringer's definition of
friendship recognizes degrees of attachment. Rationally
selfish individuals cultivate many friends who are, in
different degrees, useful to them. Thus individuals
maintain casual friends, good friends, and best friends.
Finally, however, Ringer defines a friend as "a person who
fills a need for you."[82] The same is true from the
friend's point of view.
And from his standpoint, your function is to fill a 
need for him. It's losing sight of the latter that 
causes so many friendship problems. When both sides 
understand the entire equation and perform 
accordingly, the basis for a solid, value-for-value 
relationship exists— the only kind of relationship 
which can be both honest and lasting.[83]
Ringer claims that cultivating friends involves finding 
"those people who can add the greatest amount of pleasure to 
your life."[84] This statement may be true, but not in the 
perverse sense that Ringer implies. For Ringer "honest and 
lasting" friendships are like financial investments that 
guarantee good returns. Friends wish each other well to 
incur "credits" that will translate into future fulfillment 
of their needs. Wishing a friend well is like wishing your 
bank well, because if it prospers it will fatten the account 
you maintain there. That is, Ringer views friendship as 
completely mercenary, totally lifeless, and calculated as 
much as possible to oblige others to you. It is difficult
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to imagine a more cynical or nihilistic view of human social 
relationships.
Aristotle considers Ringer's restricted definition of 
friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics. In Book VIII, Ch. 3, 
Aristotle defines three kinds of friendship, each based on a 
different object of love. First come friendships of 
utility. These friends love each other for their 
usefulness. In the second kind of friendships, friends love 
each other because they find each other mutually agreeable 
and pleasant (NE, 1156a 10-15). Aristotle characterizes
these friendships as "incidental," because the friends love 
each other as sources of pleasure or utility to themselves. 
The changing nature of both utility and pleasure undermines 
the desirability and permanence of these relationships.
Perfect friendships, on the other hand, are 
"friendships of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for 
these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are 
good in themselves- (they are) those who wish well to their 
friends for their (the friend's) sake"(NE, 1156b 5-15). For 
Aristotle, true friends are much more than useful and 
pleasant. According to Aristotle, friendships of types 1 
and 2 above cannot finally produce true friends. True 
friends wish you well for your sake alone, without regard 
for their self-interest. This view of friendship is 
preferable to Ringer's because it presupposes human morality
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and the genuine concern for others that that morality 
implies.
5.2 Repudiation Of Hobbes:
In Book I of the Republic. Socrates accepts 
Thrasymachus1 challenge to discuss justice as a rhetorical 
exercise, and Socrates emerges victorious. But the 
implications of Thrasymachus* definition of justice leave 
questions that remain unanswered. That is, Socrates has 
failed to repudiate the principle upon which Thrasymachus 
has based his definition of justice, his egoistic view of 
human nature. In Book I Socrates fails to show that ethical 
egoism is unacceptable as a first principle of society. It 
is from Glaucon and Adeimantus recognition of this failure 
that they restate and elaborate Thrasymachus* position in 
Book II.
Glaucon and Adeimantus argue that social arrangements
exist as contracts between individuals who do not have the
power to live as they choose. They are bound against their
will to agree to a contract determined by their
circumstances and not by their nature. Hence even those who
practice justice do so unwillingly.
This we could realize very clearly if we imagined 
ourselves granting to both the just and the unjust 
the freedom to do whatever they liked. We could then 
follow both of them and observe where their desires 
led them, and we would catch the just man redhanded 
travelling the same road as the unjust. The reason
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is the desire for undue gain which every organism by 
nature pursues as a good, but the law forcibly 
sidetracks him to honour inequality (II, 359b).
This quotation illustrates the point of the Gyges myth. 
Any two individuals, just or unjust, would proceed from the 
shepherd's situation as he did. Under these circumstances 
no one could resist becoming like "a god among men"[II, 
360c].
Glaucon's characterization of human nature and society 
in Book II of the Republic conforms closely to Hobbes'
statements about human nature and society in the Leviathan.
Each assumes an egoistic view of human nature and argues 
that the priority of individual self-interest has specific 
consequences as a first principle of society. Hobbes
contends that rational and prudent human beings agree to
social contracts to avoid inevitable conflict for the 
resources that make their existence possible. Individuals 
agree to cooperate socially because they are too weak to 
resist their naturally aggressive neighbors by themselves. 
Furthermore, Hobbes' would agree with Glaucon that social 
contracts would be unnecessary for anyone who could "live 
like a god among men." If someone had the power to protect 
himself and his resources from aggressors, he would not 
participate in society. Rather his self-interest would be 
better served if he didn't have to pay the price of 
sacrificing his power when he complied. Like Thrasymachus'
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tyrants, he would define justice in his own way. Hobbes' 
argues that rational individuals cannot make mistakes about 
their self-interest. Actions that seem to reflect concerns
other than self-interest in fact represent self-interest 
prudently disguised.
Socrates attacks ethical egoism in the Goraias and the
Republic by taking the opposite view. Socrates contends
that a common good which is at the same time good for
individuals could be realized in a proper city. 
Thrasymachus claims that one or the other must prevail 
because they are different. Hobbes, on the other hand, 
denies the very possibility of a common good for rational 
human beings.
But Hobbes' egoism not only fails as a first principle 
for society, it also undermines the social relationships 
that make life worth living. Hobbes egoism suffers from two 
principal types of defects. It cannot explain many common 
human actions in normal social relationships. Hobbes' 
arguments reduce to absurdity when he tries. Many common 
human actions exist that contain insights into human nature 
and that cannot be explained by Hobbes' analysis. Sometimes 
individuals act for their own good, and sometimes they act 
altruistically. Still, Hobbes might dismiss these examples 
as actions that reflect self-interest prudently disguised. 
Finally, however, Hobbes analysis requires that individuals
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act irrationally, a possibility for human action that Hobbes 
denies.
Hobbes' analysis cannot explain family relationships. 
Hobbes cannot account for the bonds that exist in 
relationships among children, parents, brothers, sisters, 
and spouses. These bonds form the basis for benevolent acts 
between family members, and they define love within the 
family unit. Family members openly express their love for
one another. They recognize occasions of special
significance for each other, birthdays, anniversaries, and 
so on. These celebrations cannot be understood in terms of 
self-interest. Rather they are a convenient means to afford 
special recognition to others that is characteristic of the 
family relationships.
But it is parental caring and sacrifice which provide
the most important counterexamples to Hobbes1 position. We 
take much time and effort, for example, to teach young 
children about the dangers of playing near deep water 
without adequate swimming instruction, which we then 
provide, or of crossing streets unless they have been 
impressed by the danger of passing cars. Parents sometimes 
risk their own lives to save their children or the children 
of others from harm, based on their moral responsibilities 
to them. As parents we encourage children to examine the 
world to discover its intricacies for themselves, and to
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determine their place within it, even while we protect them 
from its dangers. We seek at every turn to broaden their 
horizons and to prepare them for a rich, fulfilling life.
Compromises of self-interest are also common to 
families. I have a friend who was offered a lucrative 
promotion at his job. He had been with a certain company 
for several years, and the promotion seemed like a genuine 
reward for loyal and capable service, as well as reflecting 
the logical progression of his career. The pay increase 
would have allowed the family to enhance their lifestyle, 
and the added responsibility would have provided a great 
professional challenge. But there were other 
considerations. The promotion required that he relocate to 
a branch office in another city. His oldest daughter was a 
junior in high school, and she hoped to continue and 
graduate from a local school. Moreover his wife was in 
pursuit of her career, and was not keen on moving either. 
Although the decision had to be made quickly, an immediate 
move would have been difficult. He finally deferred to a 
family consensus and declined the promotion. My friend's 
decision was a response to interests other than his own. If 
his choice had only to reflect his own interests, the family 
would certainly have moved. But they did not.
Page 115
Examples of benevolent action that reflect familial 
love are common in literature. Many great stories explore 
the decisions of morally sensitive and thoughtful 
individuals who make hard choices in conceivable situations 
of human life. Remember, for example, the biblical story of 
Moses, and the sacrifices for the infant whose parents 
finally abandoned him rather than allow him to be killed as 
the Pharoah's edict had decreed. Knowing that a child has 
worked hard and fairly achieved what he set out to do is a 
common source of pride and satisfaction for parents. Nor is 
it uncommon for children to care for parents in old age. 
Consider Antigone's actions in the name of love for Oedipus, 
or those of Cordelia for King Lear. In the former case the 
bonds of family overrode allegiances to powerful civil 
authorities, while in the latter they overcame the cruelty 
and shortsightedness of the father. When other hope was 
gone the love of family remained.
Another powerful discontinuing instance of Hobbes' 
thesis occurs in the Bible. In the parable of the Prodigal 
Son and his Elder Brother,[85] a young man comes to his 
father to request his patrimony. Allow for the moment that 
the father as a Hobbesian individual can reasonably claim 
his children as his Own to this point, and that he is 
wealthy enough to bequeath a portion of his resources 
without undermining his security against aggressive 
neighbors. Hobbes' analysis implies that the children
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become threatening to the father when they mature to
individuals in their own right. It would be reasonable for 
the father to give patrimony to his son, because with the
resources he would presumably depart; that is, he would be
removed from threatening the father. But using Hobbes' 
model, how can we explain his actions at the son's return? 
The threat has returned, and the father responds with gifts, 
celebration, and other expressions of his happiness. How
can this be?
Viewing the father as a Hobbesian, financing the
younger brother to depart made more sense than his actions 
toward the older brother. He financed the younger brother
to depart, but did not even attempt to persuade the other.
Rather, he placed all of his remaining resources at the
disposal of the older brother as undifferentiated from his
own. Is the father suicidal? Does the parable recount the 
actions of a madman? The parable is not offered to explain 
the irrational activities of a father in an irrational
relationship with his sons. The father's actions cannot be 
explained using Hobbes' description of human nature. The 
actions reflect the father's love for his sons because he 
acts selflessly toward them. The parable recounts his 
attempt to treat them with equal respect and concern.
Consider also the common human act of choosing to have a
family. Hobbes observes that,
Men have no pleasure, but on the contrary, a great
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deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no 
power able to overawe them all. For every man looks 
that his companion should value him at the same rate 
he sets upon himself; and upon all signs of contempt 
or undervaluing naturally endeavors, as far as he
dares (which among them that have no common power to
keep them in quiet is far enough to make them destroy 
each other), to extort a greater value from his 
contemnors by damage and from others by example.[86]
This leads inevitably to quarreling among men and finally to
invasion to extend a realm of influence and assure the
safety of one's own. Although Hobbes includes wives, 
children, and cattle as parts of one's own, it is 
interesting to imagine the implications of this analysis as 
the children become individuals in their own right.[87] The 
children would eventually become threatening to the father 
in the same way that others have been threatening all along.
Hobbes might argue that acts of loving and caring for 
children reveal disguised self-interest, that they are 
really attempts to keep children from becoming threatening 
to parents for as long as possible. The parents' efforts 
will fail, however, because the family is not normally large 
enough to insure individual protection even if children 
remain loyal to parents. Hobbes creates problems for his 
analysis when he insists on qualitative as well as 
quantitative differences between a family and a 
commonwealth. "A family is not properly a commonwealth, 
unless it be of that power by its own number or by other 
opportunities as not to be subdued without the hazard of
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war."[88] The family cannot replace the commonwealth because 
without extraordinary power to enforce its will, members 
must still survive as individuals. In general a family's 
size affords no power to deter aggression of those who would 
usurp its resources and consequently the family structure 
has no value for collective security. Therefore, it would 
be irrational, on Hobbes' model, to choose to nurture or 
even propagate children. Having a family would be 
equivalent to directing resources away from the business of 
repelling aggressors, thus undermining one's security. 
Furthermore as the children mature, those resources would 
finally become directed against parents, because the family 
cannot replace the commonwealth. Man's desire to propagate 
children contradicts his instinct to survive as an
individual.
Hobbes could also argue that self-interest actually
precluded the propagation of children, and that, strictly 
speaking, rational individuals do not choose to have 
families. Self-interested action includes sexual 
gratification, and the fact that children often result does 
not affect the rationality of parents when they satisfy 
their natural desires. This argument would have been more 
persuasive in Hobbes' time than it is in ours. Modern
society offers a wide range of contraception methods that 
allow virtually everyone who so chooses to remain childless 
and still satisfy themselves sexually. Still, many rational
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individuals choose to propagate and raise families.
Propagating children is a powerful and obvious example
/ of selfless action that is common in human experience. It 
exists as a disconfirming instance of Hobbes' claim that 
individuals always act for their own good only. Either 
Hobbes is wrong, or men must be capable of irrational 
action. The latter possibility violates Hobbes' law of 
nature, "by which a man is forbidden to do that which is 
destructive of his life or takes away the means of 
preserving the same and to omit that by which he thinks it 
may best be preserved."[89] Therefore Hobbes is wrong, and 
men sometimes do act for reasons other than their own good. 
Hobbes' view of human nature is untrue as an empirical claim 
about how men act because it fails to account for many kinds 
of common human action. Furthermore his egoism is 
unacceptable as an explanation of what motivates human 
behavior, because it forces him to argue for a position that 
is clearly absurd.
5.3 The Superiority Of Ethical Objectivism:
As we have seen, egoism fails to explain human nature, 
and it cannot serve as a first principle of social 
cooperation. Benevolence exists as a possibility for human 
action. That is, human beings reserve a natural disposition 
to be moral, at least some of the time. This fact allows us 
to invest moral terms with meaning. Societies that include
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benevolent individuals can institute laws that serve as 
guides to encourage moral actions. These laws then become 
suitable objects of moral evaluation. Social cooperation 
creates environments where benevolence and morality can 
exist and flourish.
Human beings are not naturally self-interested beings. 
Rather they are naturally moral beings, capable of 
benevolent action. If human beings are capable of 
benevolence, then they have a natural capacity for morality. 
Inconsistency in moral behavior indicates only imperfection 
in an imperfect world. Individuals are moral when they 
interact socially for reasons other than self-interest—  
when they act benevolently toward each other. Sometimes 
individuals do things for and with others rather than simply 
to them. The language of moral terms derives its meaning 
from these exchanges. Individuals act lawfully or 
unlawfully, morally or immorally in society, and they do not 
respond favorably to an essentially lawless, strictly 
non-moral social environment. Although the actual conduct 
of individuals toward one another is not consistently moral 
or immoral, men do sometimes act for the good of others.
The capacity for benevolent action also helps define 
the character of human society. Human beings are naturally 
moral because they are capable of benevolence. A just 
society is a logical extension of benevolent individual
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action to natural social interaction. Furthermore, egoism, 
the non-moral position, has no place in such a society. 
Egoism is essentially antisocial because it precludes the 
possibility of that morality upon which social cooperation 
is naturally based, and it denies the possibility of 
significant cooperation. It precludes actions and 
relationships that run to the core of human experience. It 
requires that humans exist as subhuman beings. Finally, 
neither individuals nor societies are what egoists claim 
they are. It is not true that there is nothing in social 
arrangements that throws individuals together like 
self-interest keeps them apart. Morality does.
John Rawls' theory of justice attempts to synthesize 
the classical and modern understandings of relationships 
between individuals and society. Rawls imagines a society 
that includes basic institutions structured by principles of 
"justice as fairness." These principles allow social 
institutions to encourage the moral conduct of individuals.
Rawls establishes an environment for ethical 
objectivism when he includes the "original position" in his 
analysis. The conditions for choice in the original 
position are so restrictive, and those for their application 
so general, that Rawls achieves with his theory a situation 
analagous to the ideal polis that Plato sought.
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To the extent that Plato and Rawls attempt to refine 
ethical objectivism and natural law theory by imagining
arrangements of social cooperation responsive to the needs 
of moral men, they are involved in a common if not identical 
philosophical enterprise. Each has rejected egoism and
offered a social ideal in its place. As visionaries each
has attempted to fit social cooperation to the needs of 
members from a moral point of view. Each imagines an 
arrangement of social cooperation that allows naturally 
benevolent human beings to interact socially by requiring
that their institutions reflect basic moral principles. In 
this sense each argues for theories of ethical objectivism 
and natural law to help men realize a good life from their 
social cooperation. These attempts give reason to hope that 
more concrete and less preliminary answers to questions 
about ethical objectivism can be found.
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1. This comes from the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
edited by Paul Edwards. New York: MacMillan Co., 1967. See 
vol.3, "Epictetus to Hilbert," p.71.
2. This is Walter Stace's definition. See Stace, 
Walter. "Ethical Absolutism and Ethical Relativism" in 
Ethics in Perspective, edited by Karsten and Paula 
Rothenberg Struhl. New York: Random House Publishing, 1975. 
p.51-60.
3. Cogley, John, et al. Natural Law and Modern Society. 
New York and Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1963.
4. This is also Stace's strategy. See "Ethical 
Absolutism and Ethical Relativism," p.52.
5. A good example is Brown, Ina Corinne. Understanding 
Other Cultures. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963. See
also Benedict, Ruth. "Cultural Relativism" in Meaning and 
Existence, edited by William T. Blackstone. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston Inc., 1971.
6. This is a recurring theme in popular music. The 
specific reference is to a song titled "Make Your Own Kind 
of Music" by "Mama Cass" Elliott. New York: Columbia
Records, 11969.
7. Peaie, Norman V, The Power of Positive Thinking. New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953. p.l.
8. Ibid., p.IX.
9. Ibid., p.l.
10. Ibid., p.XI.
11. The reference is to Jacque's famous speech on the
"ages of man" in William Shakespeare's play, M  You Like It,
(II, vii, 139).
12. Sheehy, Gail. Passages. New York: Bantam Books, 
1977. p.29.
13. Ibid., p.105.
14. Dyer, Wayne. Your Erroneous Zones. New York: Avon 
Books, T. Crowell Co., 1977. p.20.
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15. Dyer arrives at this conclusion through some 
remarkable syllogisms. He intends to establish that "you can 
attack the myth of not being in charge of your emotions 
through logic." (Dyer, p.20). This is his example of logic, 
a syllogism in which the major and minor premises agree:
Major premise: Aristotle is a man.
Minor premise: All men have facial hair.
Conclusion: Aristotle has facial hair.
This is his example of illogic, a syllogism in which the 
major and minor premises do not agree:
Major premise: Aristotle has facial hair.
Minor premise: All men have facial hair.
Conclusion: Aristotle is a man.
Having established the difference between logic and illogic, 
he offers this syllogism to "forever put to rest the notion 
that you cannot take charge of your own emotional world." 
(Dyer, p.21).
Major premise: I can control my thoughts.
Minor premise: My feelings come from my thoughts.
Conclusion: I can control my feelings.
That done, you "begin to examine your life in the light of 
choices you have made or failed to make. This puts all 
responsibility for what you are and how you feel on you. 
Becoming happier and more effective will mean becoming more 
aware of the choices that are available to you. YOU ARE THE 
SUM TOTAL OF YOUR CHOICES, and I am just "far out" enough to 
believe that with an appropriate amount of motivation and 
effort you can be anything you choose." (Dyer, p.14).
16. Not surprisingly, Dyer's "common sense" approach 
emphasizes "dealing with" rather than solving life's 
problems.
17. Throughout this paper the masculine gender, when I 
use it generically, refers to women and men equally.
18. Fast, Julius. Body Language. New York: Lippincott
Publishing Co., 1970. (back cover).
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19. Ibid., p.2.
20. Ibid., p.5.
21. Dyer, Wayne. Your Erroneous Zones. p.173.
22. Ringer, Robert. Looking Out for #1. New York: Crest 
Books, CBS Publications Co., 1977. p.44.
23. Ibid., p. 51. r'
24. According to Ringer, every action in life, 
especially those involving relationships, should be based on 
"value-for-value" exchanges; that is, when the value an 
individual places on a relationship equals the pleasure he 
derives from it.
25. Ringer denies that his position is hedonistic 
because it includes this "rational, civilized tag." Primary 
moral duty lies in the pursuit of pleasure so long as the 
pursuer does not interfere with the rights of others. 
Rationality precludes interference, which causes more pain 
than pleasure.
26. Ringer, Robert. LflaMng Out £&L 11. p.21.
27. Ibid., p.46.
28. Ibid., p.22.
29. Ibid., p.22.
30. Ibid., p.21.
31. Toynbee, Arnold. Greek Historical Thought. New 
York: Mentor Books, 1962. (acknowledgments).
32. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan: Parts X and II. New 
York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1958. p.107.
33. Ibid., p.110.
34. Ibid., p.106.
35. Ibid., p.105.
36. Ibid., p.105.
37. Ibid., p.24.
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38. Although the authors of the "self-help" literature 
do not mention it specifically, this sense of society as 
extraneous to individual fulfillment pervades their work 
like it does Hobbes'.
39. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, p.107.
40. Ibid., p.139.
41. For an elaboration of this idea, see Maritain,
Jacques. Man and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1951. ch.1.
42. For an elaboration of this idea, see Arendt, 
Hannah. The Human Condition. New York: Anchor Books,
Doubleday and Co., 1959. ch.1-2.
43. Ehrenberg, Victor. The Greek State. New York: W.W. 
Norton and Co., 1960. p.98.
44. Aristotle points to the natural dependence of
individuals to prove that the polis is the primary natural
association of men. See Aristotle, Politics. (Bk.I, Ch.2, 
1253a25).
45. Ehrenberg, Victor. The Greek State, p.98.
46. I have used W.D. Woodhead's translation for this 
and all subsequent references to the Gorgias.
47. Thus it is of little consequence that Socrates has 
arrived too late to hear Gorgias' "fine and varied display."
48. The joke on Socrates is soon exposed when, after 
several single-word replies from Gorgias, Socrates comments, 
"your answers could not be briefer" (449d).
49. These "tricks of the trade" constitute the real 
power of rhetoric and comprise the body of what the Sophists 
teach.
50. Grube, G.M.A. Plato's Thought. Boston, Mass.: 
Beacon Press, 1961. p.53.
51. According to Callicles, this strategy works two 
ways for Socrates. "If a man speaks on the basis of 
convention, you slyly question him on the basis of nature, 
but if he follows nature, you follow convention"(483).
52. This discussion recalls the Athenians' position in 
the Melian debate. The Athenians argued that Melos would 
either agree to capitulation or suffer destruction, because
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"natural justice" allowed powerful city-states to subdue 
those weaker than themselves. See Thucydides, History of the 
Peloponnesian War. translated by Rex Warner. Baltimore, 
Maryland: Penguin Books, 1954. (Bk.5, Ch.7, p.358-366).
53. Although Callicles agreed with Socrates' analogy at 
488e, that the better are the stronger with the nobler 
ordinances, he tries to reject that position at 489b.
54. For an elaboration of these characteristics of 
individuals and their relationship to the city-state, see 
Republic I, 368.
55. Footnotes in Grube's translation of the Republic 
indicate that a festival was held, possibly for Bendis, "a 
Thracian goddess whose worship had recently been introduced 
in the Piraeus." See Grube, G.M.A. Plato's Republic. 
Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Co., 1974., (Footnote 
1, p.2). Alan Bloom concurs that the festival for Bendis was 
probably why Socrates left Athens that day. See Bloom, Alan. 
The Republic of Plato. New York and London: Basic Books, 
Inc., 1968. (Interpretive essay, p.311).
56. I have used G.M.A. Grube's translation for this and 
all subsequent references to the Republic.
57. Thrasymachus' precise sense of rulers as those who 
know their advantage well enough to establish laws that will 
reflect it has been elucidated by his rejection of 
Cleitophon1s position.
58. In terms of the Euthyphro. Adeimantus demands a 
defense of Socrates' claim that the gods love piety because 
it is good. See Plato. Euthyphro. translated by Lane Cooper 
in Tjaa Collected Dialogues of. Plato edited by Huntington 
Cairns and Edith Hamilton. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1969. p.169.
59. Actually the philosopher-kings have this quality 
before they are introduced to the Forms. See Republiclll. 
412d).
60. Bloom, Alan. The Republic of Plato. (Interpretive 
essay, p.407).
61. See Plato. Crito. translated by Hugh Tredennick, in 
The Collected Works of Plato, edited by Huntington Cairns 
and Edith Hamilton. (50b-54e).
62. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1971. p.124.
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64. Ibid.,. p.120.
65. Ibid., p.18.
66. Ibid., p.120.
67. Ibid., p.128.
68. Ibid., p.127.
69. Ibid., p.131.
70. Ibid., p.132 (my emphasis).
71. Ibid., p.135.
72. Ibid., p.64.
73. Ibid., p.408.
74. Ibid., p.46.
75. Ibid., p.46.
76. Ibid., p.426.
77. Ibid., p.437.
78. Peale, Norman V. The Power of Positive Thinking.
p. 7.
79. Ibid., p.8.
80. Dyer, Wayne. Your Erroneous Zones, p.173.
81. Ringer, Robert. Looking Out for #1. p.44.
82. Ibid., p.255.
83. Ibid., p.261.
84. Ibid., p.264.
85. See "The Parable of the Prodigal Son and His Elder 
Brother" in the Holy Bible, (King James Version): Gospel 
according to Luke, Ch. 15, 11-^32.
86. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, p.106.
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87. That is, with an equality of strength with their 
father, their own beliefs about the superiority of their 
wisdom, and their natural right to everything for their 
survival.
88. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, p.167.
89. Ibid., p.109.
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